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hard and Soft
How nonliteral is our notion of the figure? Generally, it is supposed that the figure 
of speech, be it in the form of metaphor or any other type of figuration, by definition 
excludes the literal. In metaphors such as “the wheels of justice” or “the fruits of 
knowledge,” the image of the first term is transferred or carried over—the 
etymological meaning of the word metaphor—to a second term making the 
combination a figure of speech. The figure is a matter of doubling, yes, but moreover 
a matter of what we could call a dissimilar mimesis,1 since without exception it 
concerns the likening of two wholly unlike terms. What exactly is transferred and 
in what direction? That is not so easy to say. On the one hand, it is precisely the 
literalness, the slow but sure turning of wheels and the juiciness of fruits that gives 
justice and knowledge more tangible contours and weight. On the other hand, the 
reverse occurs too, the abstract concepts twist the literalism of the first terms, 
making wheels a model of logic and persistence and fruit one of growth and 
fertility. While the two terms mimic one another, they do so in very different ways 
by selecting different characteristics from each other in order to produce a 
convincing likeness. Though in their everyday usage the figurative and the literal 
seem sharply contrasted, reality is more complex. The figure cannot be identified 
with either of its terms. A metaphor is not the image of one term having been 
transferred to another; it is that very transference itself, as a purely tropic transition.
For this notion of the figure and figuration, we have proposed the term “figurate,” 
distinguishing it from both the figurative, with its emphasis on mimesis, and the 
figural, accentuating the emergent nature of physis. Even though we have been able 
to create a larger framework that positions the figurate between physis and mimesis, 
we should reiterate and develop this concept further within the context of 
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architecture and architectural history. If it is true that architecture is structured by 
the sequential transitions we discovered in Paleolithic caves—stone-water, stone-
image, stone-spirit—we should be able to trace such transitions in the history of 
architecture. This is necessary not only because of architecture’s prominent place in 
the machinery of grace but also to understand the role of the grace machine in such 
a history. Erich Auerbach stresses this point again and again in his study of the 
figure, the 1947 book Mimesis. It wouldn’t go too far to say that his book argues that 
history is the history of mimesis, for original and copy are separated from one 
another in time and “contained in the flowing stream which is historical life.”2 As is 
evident from the book’s subtitle—The Representation of Reality in Western 
Literature3—Auerbach views the figure within the conceptual framework of the 
figurative. Interestingly, one of the central concepts he uses to understand the role 
of the second term, i.e., the copy, is “fulfillment,” a term with a messianic as well as 
hylomorphic ring to it, as if it fills the mold of the original, primary term.4 By one 
thing fitting in another, what Auerbach calls a temporal, horizontal relationship, 
historical events precede others while functioning as their original model. Because 
such a structure transcends the domain of cause and effect, Auerbach also suggests 
a “vertical” relationship that connects things via a “spiritual act,” alluding to the 
messianic character of fulfillment: the second term carries out the promise of the 
first.5 The carrying over of the figure becomes the carrying out of a divine promise.
Gilles Deleuze, the philosopher of the figural, stresses the spiritual too, yet on a 
far smaller scale, as a “spirituality of the body,” where the body functions as “the 
material of the figure.”6 Basing these observations on the paintings of Francis 
Bacon, the French philosopher repudiates any possible form of mimesis. Indeed, 
all the paintings are, in their search for what Deleuze calls animal spirits, produced 
by a complex set of “wipings,” “deformations,” and “spasms,” words deeply influenced 
by the deconstructionist age Deleuze worked in.7 By kneading the paint as 
primordial matter the figure arises from an immanent plane of carnal sensations; 
destroying even the likeness to itself, it becomes a product of blind emergence, of 
morphogenetic physis. In that sense, history does not even exist for Deleuze; since 
every event counts as original, it directly turns against visibility and consequently 
pays the price of unsightliness and monstrosity. In contrast to Auerbach, he fully 
appreciates that the spirit is one of self-movement and horizontality. After all, the 
man-animal, as he calls it, is an automaton, a self-mover. In his conception such 
movement completely destroys and “decomposes” the posture of the body; a 
thought that could not be more diametrically opposed to the theory of grace, 
which states that movement invariably leads to the composition of the figure. 
Deleuze is not mistaken in the view that the figure opposes the notion of structure, 
the theory of grace supports that wholeheartedly, only in the view that the figure is 
the mere incarnation of such a theoretical opposition. Deleuze’s—Bacon’s—figural 
depictions only stand upright because they start out as mimicking bodily structure 
to then be deconstructed by wipings and spasms; they do not stand by themselves. 
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As we saw earlier, grace acknowledges weakening and sideways movements solely 
as the flexible mobilizing of the members to create stance. Deleuze’s plane of flesh 
is, we should keep in mind, exactly that, a plane: by definition it cannot explain 
verticality. The implicit verticalism of a term such as “emergence” cannot exist 
without incorporating a form of transcendence.
So far the arguments of the two theoreticians of the figure seem to be mutually 
exclusive. For Auerbach, all things are images, externalities, since they are enveloped 
and carried along in the light of divine providence. Things can move all right, but 
only in the realm of an external consciousness. For Deleuze, all things are flesh, 
pure bodily interior and sensation while the image can only become visible as a 
distorted image. His figures emerge in the light, yet are unaware of it. They move 
while driven by dark, internal forces. The figurate in its turn accepts exactly one 
half of each position: it accepts mimesis as the doubling of two images, on the 
condition that it detours via the interior of physis. It acknowledges the inside-out 
procedure of emergence as an extension of the outside-in procedure of mimesis, 
and vice versa. Or, when formulated in terms of hylomorphism and morphogenetics: 
figures are cast in a mold insofar as it offers enough room to grow. So, Deleuze is 
right, there is a fundamental weakness and softness to things, only to prove 
Auerbach’s point that softness allows them to mimic others. As we have seen in the 
case of both the Minotaur and the Paleolithic shaman, man turns into a man-
animal by procedurally internalizing the animal. Man’s softness, so to speak, 
enables him to partially transform into an animal by mimetically absorbing images 
of animals and living between them. While he mirrors himself in the animal, he 
changes internally.
In short, the procedure is contrapuntal, not dialectic, which is essential when 
raising the question of history. The method of grace is not to oppose two nouns in 
the hope that they will be hyphenated, but one becoming adjectival to the other. 
Contrapuntal means that in the juxtaposition of soft and hard or self and other, one 
term is internalized as a gift, as an appearance plunging into the depths of matter to 
re-emerge again as an appearance. What enables this is neither a realm of pure, 
universal consciousness, nor of pure internal sensation. Dialectics, as we know, is 
the spiraling history of thesis and antithesis, of mold and form, a history of 
alternating overpowerings. It is no accident that Hegel’s most important chapter in 
The Phenomenology of Spirit discusses the role of consciousness in the relationship 
between master and slave (Herrschaft und Knechtschaft),8 which inevitably turns 
out to be a story of self-consciousness. How could such terms ever be synthesized 
when one never internalizes the other, that is, without the Self turning into the 
Other? The contrapuntal structure of grace writes another type of history, one 
fundamentally of empowering and enabling. And since the latter word means 
“inhabiting,” architecture plays a central role in this history. It is a history of soft and 
hard, or as we called it before, of weakness and strength, of arsis and thesis, and 
though it follows the cyclical structure of gift exchange and not the linear, 
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progressive model of ever-increasing spirit, it is based on a similar triadic system, 
what Hegel called a “triplicity.”9
The first thing we could say about a possible “phenotechnology of spirit” is that 
it would be a technological history, since in the transforming—Freud would call it 
Umformen—from thing to appearance, which is what the figure does, technology 
is indispensable. All procedures of figures coming into existence—meaning things 
as soft-hard or weak-strong constructs as well as thing-appearance or matter-
image entities—are technical procedures. It is a history of a far wider distribution 
of spirit and consciousness than the merely human spirit can explain, which is the 
history Hegel wrote. Technology is what agitates and mobilizes the softness in 
matter to produce figures. Therefore it can never be a dialectic history of soft and 
hard like the phenomenology Bachelard conceived in his two books on the subject, 
Earth and Reveries of Will and Earth and Reveries of Repose. Considering that 
some of their chapter titles—“The Cave,” “The Labyrinth,” and “The Serpent”10—
discuss topics so close to our own examples, we should first expand in more detail 
on the differences between phenomenology and phenotechnology.
Phenomenology is descriptive since it records how figures appear in the human 
mind; it is bound to the spirit, or as we formulated in the second chapter: for 
phenomenology appearances always appear-as. What phenomenology does not do 
is ask itself why it is possible for things to appear in the human mind; it assigns all 
qualities that allow things to be appearances to purely human qualities, namely 
human consciousness. Phenotechnology does not accept this. It states that for 
things to appear, they must share at least some of the qualities of appearing, imagery 
or consciousness. That is why we have termed them thing-appearances or, for short, 
figures. As we said in the context of vaghezza and Nebelglanz: things have to be 
visible before they are seen. Some of the quality of the image must be innate to 
figures—a quality we have termed radiance. Yet, since there are millions of images 
of things possible, radiance must be far larger and fuzzier than what constitutes 
an image. Radiance, then, enables images, but by and of itself radiance is nothing 
like an image. Similar to visibility, figures have to be thinkable before they are 
understood; the quality of thought too must be innate to figures. That the world is 
intelligible cannot be ascribed to the structure of our brains. Surely the world was 
intelligible, experienceable, and visible long before humans appeared on the planet, 
even before there were any eyes or brains. In phenotechnology all these “X-able” 
forms are quite literally considered to be en-abling, and by consequence X must be 
viewed as shared, exchanged, and circulated.
Why, then, call this a technology? If we would distribute consciousness equally 
over all things, animate and inanimate, which is what Bergson does in Matter and 
Memory when he states that all things are images, we would have to reinstate spirit 
as an all-encompassing agent, even when moving it from the realms of heaven to 
those of the earth. All things would have to swim around in the same light. 
Phenotechnology does not accept that either. It would deny the variety of shades 
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and tints of consciousness and average them out into a universal form of half-
opaque, half-transparent whiteness. Figures do shine like Bergson’s luminous 
images, but variably, intermittently, and unevenly. Figures are not pure matter 
anymore nor have they reached the status of image yet, and can therefore exist 
anywhere between those two poles without ever being one or the other. As they are 
underway to being images, some shine brightly like rainbows, while others barely 
emit any light at all. The point being that such variation can only be established by 
the intermediary of technology, since by definition technology means transformation. 
All figures are transformations, above all of thing (not-matter-anymore) and 
appearance (not-image-yet)—on that fundamental level humans do not even enter 
the equation. And that makes it a nonhuman technology. Despite its dependence on 
human effort, the history of technology is by no means of a human order. On the 
contrary, qua history human development is wholly dependent on the history of 
technology. To quote Donna Haraway again: we have never been human. Technology 
has its own history, which in the Hegelian, teleological sense means that it owns its 
future, one that involves soft and hard, movement and object, arsis and thesis. Its 
historical path is directly linked to the structure of the grace machine. Technology 
is not there to move matter to another state of matter, but to a state of appearing—it 
is tropic, or phenotropic.
Especially in Earth and Reveries of Will, Bachelard considers our relations with 
matter within the framework of a “dialectic of hard and soft, a dialectic which 
governs every image of terrestrial matter. Earth, unlike the three other elements, is 
first and foremost characterized by resistance.”11 With this sentence at the start of 
the book he is just warming up; a few pages later he speaks of a “phenomenology 
of opposition,” where matter is “attacked” with tools considered as “weapons” 
handled in a “fighting spirit.”12 Words like “battle,” “hostility,” “combat,” “violence” 
even, return on virtually every page. Though scholars have often classified 
Bachelard’s version of dialectics as less confrontational than Hegel’s, none of that is 
present here: our relationship with matter is one of a “will to power” that strives for 
“domination,” that is, pure and simple overpowering. In the world of phenomenology 
these are unusually harsh statements, though it must be said that they expose its 
underlying and unresolved dualisms. According to Bachelard, matter never comes 
close to Bergson’s image-state, and does not even contain images: to be formed, 
matter requires to have images forced upon it by human imagination. And the fact 
that in Bachelard’s book matter never comes up with its own ideas and images, 
never sharing any bits or fragments of consciousness, must be the reason why it 
contains no history. Compare this to the co-evolution of matter, tools, and humans 
that we encountered in Leroi-Gourhan’s works where matter invents tools and 
tool-using hands change the structure of the brain.13 Bachelard’s conception of 
tools and work remains throughout the sheer administration of force, stripped of 
any flexibility, relaxation, or measure. To be sure, during work we apply force, 
during the hammering of copper, the kneading of bread or clay, during the firing 
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of ceramics or the casting of red hot iron, yet nothing in that activity is of a dialectic 
or oppositional nature.
Rather the reverse is the case. When kneading clay, we are not on the outside of it, 
we are on the inside. We inhabit the things we knead and hammer. How else would 
we be able to measure the amount of force? How else would we know when to stop? 
When relying solely on our eyes, we would always be too late. As we concluded 
earlier in the case of hammering: we have to become hammer-like to be able to 
hammer. And it is the same with kneading: we have to become clay-like to knead the 
clay, dough-like to knead the dough, since it is their softness that needs to work, not 
our strength. Through us and our tools these materials knead and form themselves; 
it is their consciousness, their self-movement that directs them toward the image. We 
are merely discovering a softness already present, be it via our hands or via tools, be 
it in dough or steel, be it while molding car parts or cutting human tissue during 
complicated surgery. We treat steel as gently as we do flesh. We do extend ourselves, 
that is, in any specific relationship with matter we do extend the Self, yet this can only 
occur insofar as we are able to incorporate the Other. The prosthetic nature of tools 
and work operates via the mimetic route laid out by the material. What happens here 
is far more convoluted than our hardness opposing the hardness of matter. In the 
processes of technology, it is matter that has to produce the image, not us, and for 
that to happen matter has to mobilize its softness, its capacity for figuration. The 
matter-image or physis-mimesis relationship is not one of dialectical opposition but 
of contrapuntal grace. Matter enables us, and via the tool we enable matter.
Still, Bachelard was on the right track when following Leroi-Gourhan’s 
distinction between hard and soft from L’Homme et la matière14 to understand the 
relationship between image and matter, and though treating it as a matter of 
dialectics, this distinction does raise the issue of history, even if we will view it as a 
history of empowerings, not of alternated overpowerings. Thing-appearances 
knead each other, and that means history, not dialectics, but certainly not the 
ramblings of causality, chance, and contingency either. In our case, it means 
architectural history. If the proposed model of the previous chapter, the model of 
the Paleolithic cave, has any value, then it should be able to show itself in what 
Hegel called “shapes of consciousness” (Bewusstseinsformen), i.e., the forms that 
consciousness takes on in different types of matter-image transformations.15 
Maybe we should call them “styles of consciousness.” On the whole, I believe 
history is the history of mimesis, as Auerbach suggested, but as this history is 
material and technological, it implies a history of physis too. What enters via 
mimesis comes out as physis. And vice versa. It is a history of transitions and 
transformations, a history not simply of material technologies, but a phenotechnical 
history of carving, casting, firing, pouring, modeling, injecting, and dozens of other 
soft-to-hard techniques. By definition this mobilizing of softness results in a 
history of figuration since architecture in its quest for the image remains a style of 
consciousness, not consciousness itself.
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the Spirit and the Lithic
Figurate architecture, then, is an architecture that develops and uses material 
transformations in the conceptual framework of figuration. This is how we defined 
it coming out of the Paleolithic caves. As became clear in the study of the caves, 
the material soft-to-hard transition cannot guide architecture all the way to 
transfiguration. It required other techniques of figuration to reach the final stage, 
realized in the caves by means of painting, yet under different conditions it could 
also be achieved by wallpaper, tapestries, furnishing, glass, pottery, anything in any 
combination that extends and furthers the thing-appearance transformation. 
The sequence of prefiguration, figuration, and transfiguration can be distributed 
over different materials and techniques. Each material allows for a specific set of 
transitions, mobilized by a specific set of techniques and accompanied by a specific 
type of figuration. These combinations we call styles. Styles are not structuralist or 
linguistic entities; they are soft-hard or physis-mimesis transition typologies falling 
under the general phenotechnical category of the thing-appearance transition. In 
short, all architectures figurate, but they do so in very different ways. That means 
styles do not follow one another. History does not make styles line up chronologically 
in a specific order so as to evolve in a specific direction. Yet it is not directionless 
either; the technologies effectuating the soft-hard transition come in different 
forms and these forms heavily influence stylistic changes, but these style forms in 
their turn influence the technologies. Therefore, we can never follow a singularly 
technological route or a purely stylistic one. One empowers the other, one 
transforms the other, but still they can be called trajectories or paths created by 
oscillating between matter-technology and appearance-image. Techniques based 
on one material can produce images that later affect the techniques of other 
materials; a back-and-forth trajectory, though not dialectic in the sense that they 
are oppositional, more like the two terms or poles of figuration.
There are several consequences to the concept of a phenotechnical history of 
architecture. I think it is fair to say that generally speaking architectural history has 
the problem of dealing with specific styles as explained by architecture’s interiority, 
its own specific rules and autonomous themes, while the history of those styles is 
explained by external conditions, be they sociopolitical, economic, or technological. 
According to traditional architectural history, the rules that drive architecture within 
the entity of a style are incapable of steering architecture from one style to the other. 
As if substance and accident are simply alternating. That won’t do, of course. And 
the first reason why historiography falls short is its incapacity to conceptualize 
technology; the second reason is that when historians decide to conceptualize 
technology, it invariably results in some form of materialism, as if architecture’s 
interiority is suddenly based on engineering. As a consequence, we end up either 
with linguistic-semiotic or techno-materialist histories. In architecture, as in other 
disciplines, we are in deep need of an inclusive, bridging theory, of which one example 
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would be Donna Haraway’s “material semiotics,”16 though I prefer phenotechnology. 
A phenotechnical history has a past and a future, it follows a path, has direction, a 
Hegelian telos, but history as a whole does not. Phenotechnical histories transcend 
periodic style entities; at the same time, neither do they dissolve in a single progressive 
history that connects all style occurrences. The history of style, then, is non-
chronological, anachronic history; the forms of consciousness connect up all right, 
but not according to the sequence of time. We can detect and follow many different 
teleological lines of specific matter-image involvements, trajectories are histories in 
the sense that they explain what occurs within the styles as much as between them.
And where there is telos there is spirit. Not a spirit guiding us all the way from the 
beginning to the end, delivering us at the endstation of Hegel’s Absolute Knowledge, 
nor the short-term spirits of Zeitgeist that remain stuck in temporality. Yet a spirit 
jumping across time with huge effects on thought, mood, and psychology. Of 
all the arts architecture is the technology of mood, more subtle than music and 
simultaneously more powerful. Mood is the shift from what we called the gap, or 
room, where nothing has control over anything, to the moment when appearances 
appear. It is the vapor on the walls of the cave. In between the gap and appearances 
we find pure mood, because it shows that the images are coming from nowhere, and 
are only there to occupy your mind. What we called lithic psychology in the previous 
chapter, i.e., what the stone undergoes in its interactions with water, its accumulative 
transformations and metamorphoses, is what we undergo when we meet it. We feel 
it too, and we are bound to feel it or else we can never finish the self-movement of 
the stone by the self-movement of the animal paintings. Something crucial occurs 
here, something we can hardly put our finger on. When using the word self-
movement in the context of the cave paintings, our post-Renaissance, neoplatonic 
minds can only accept that as an illusion: the painted animals do not really move, 
they are representations of movement, and good luck with that. But when using the 
word self-movement in the context of Hegel, who uses the term throughout The 
Phenomenology of Spirit, it means consciousness of a purpose, directionality: matter 
becoming aware, matter rising up from itself. The confusion between the two 
notions of self-movement is no accident of language: matter can only rise from its 
own grave by becoming an image. Neither the moving away from matter, nor the 
arrival at the image can be fully completed since the figure keeps the door open to 
both sides. Making statements such as “mimesis is original,” “those paintings are 
real,” or “stone coming to life,” as we did over the course of the previous chapter, 
inevitably implies the reverse as well: life returning to stone. That is where the 
doubling lies: not between the depiction of an animal and a real animal, keeping the 
doorway between reality and illusion safely closed, but the doubling as a confusion, 
or better, fusion, of the two. The doubling is the constant flickering between stillness 
and movement, between stone and life, between, well, death and life.
Let me interrupt myself a bit longer and finish this train of thought by 
connecting it to the introductory remarks on the figurative and the figural. We 
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should keep in mind that both Auerbach and Deleuze would each claim an 
exclusive right to realism. Auerbach-realism is that of doubling, of mimesis, while 
Deleuze-realism is that of physis, what Francis Bacon calls “brute fact,” i.e., the 
painting itself as a fact instead of its representation.17 Deleuze would say to 
Auerbach that mimetic doubling is exactly the proof of realist art not being able to 
deal with reality, since by trying to get a grip on the image it loses its grip on reality. 
Auerbach would retort by saying that Deleuze’s spastic monsters might be singular 
creatures, yet pay the price of being wiped out, since by trying to get a grip on 
reality this form of realist art loses its grip on the image. And, yes, Deleuze’s realism 
is as contradictory as Auerbach’s: in trying to make an image of the non-image the 
brute fact exposes itself as fiction.
The figurate does not simply take a position between the two sides of the 
argument; that would lead to paradox or ambiguity, in the mere hope that the 
question is solved outside the range of language. Of course, in a “material semiotics” 
that can never suffice. The argument of the figurate is that the figure is neither, 
neither material nor semiotic nor both. The material of the cave has transformed 
so much that it is not stone anymore and has taken on the image of an animal but 
without reference. It acknowledges the Other by absorbing it into the Self: it is 
mimesis all right, but a non-reflective, absorptive mimesis. Self-consciousness and 
self-movement as a form of “self-othering”—truly a form of ontological gymnastics. 
It processes the image as a material and gives up the material as an image. Very 
much a case of swallowing and digestion. By making the doubling a form of 
contrapuntal exchange, the gift cycle saves us from limbo, from the double-noun 
state where the figure never moves an inch between the poles of physis and mimesis.
In the caves it all started with the stone being moved away from itself by the 
water. It is extraordinary; unnatural to the point of being artificial. The ultra-high-
tech of the cave’s stone-water entanglement softens the limestone until it starts 
mimicking parts of animals, almost as if the architecture stretches out with a 
mimetic device or some kind of mimetic antenna or fingertip, intrusive and curious 
like a water spirit or nymph, allowing the figures and shamanic visions to sprout via 
paint, dance, percussion, and song. The whole trajectory of stone to dance, so to 
speak, is a continuation of figuration, or a sequence of figurations where in 
Auerbach’s sense each stage promises the next, which is why we have called 
architecture’s stone-water phase one of prefiguration, expressly borrowing the term 
from Auerbach.18 With the difference that we use smaller spirits compared with 
Auerbach’s, as small as Deleuze’s, except they are not earthly but water spirits. 
Prefiguration, then, is that stage where matter is being taken away from itself, yet 
suspended on the verge of becoming painting. The stages of figuration and 
transfiguration are its fulfillments, turning the not-stone-anymore into appearances, 
releasing the animals, man-animals, and spirits. Which means invading our brains, 
since spirits have no other place to go. Maybe that is the point where they turn into 
ghosts. Their Hegelian self-movement, their purpose is not to look like specific 
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animals outside the cave, but to be interiorized—the main reason why we tend to 
think they originate in our own minds. When believing they are illusions, they 
might as well be hallucinations. Lithic psychology tells us things are different, part 
of exchanges and cycles: stone moving away from materiality, images moving away 
from human consciousness. The cave is the primordial model of this sequence of 
transformations.
This “mimetic tip” of architecture’s spirit is its softest point, and every material 
technique has its own limit of how far it can go in its striving for mimesis, being 
limited by the structure of physis. Every material reaches as deeply as it can, via its 
soft technologies, into the depths of the triple figuration sequence. Though the 
cave model relies on a highly developed technology of water interaction, it cannot 
reach beyond the first stage; as said before, figuration and transfiguration have to 
be taken care of by other means. Crucial in this equation is the fact that it concerns 
limestone providing the softness of the cave’s stone. Limestone, we should note, 
is created by eons of depositing the tiniest animal skeletons on the bottom of 
the ocean. Skeletons of crinoids or sea lilies. Limestone consists of billions and 
billions of dead sea lilies: it dazzles the mind to realize that the formula of a 
few paragraphs ago—life returning to stone—is the driving force behind the 
mechanism of exchange. Indeed, “limestone is concreted ocean,” as Adrian Stokes 
put it so beautifully in Stones of Rimini.19 In that sense, we cannot even say that the 
process starts with the stone being moved away from itself by water. Limestone is 
the product of water, its outer shape inside the cave as well as its inner structure 
hidden in the geological layers of the Permian.20 Billions and billions of petrified 
images accumulated in the limestone, fossils lying in their stone bed for hundreds 
of millions of years. The limestone does not release its images literally, only as the 
capacity for transformation and figuration, returning in the form of different 
animals, that is, land animals, mammals. The return is driven by the Aristotelian 
route from mineral to animal, surely, though with the knowledge the path was first 
established by transforming from animal to mineral, the system takes on the 
familiar shape of cyclical exchange.
Our question should now be: if the cave is the model for the phenotechnical 
conception of architecture, is it also the model for its material transformations 
and how these lead through the transitions of prefiguration, figuration, and 
transfiguration? We can answer that immediately: yes, all figurate architecture is 
based on material soft-to-hard transformation, and, yes, they are all involved in the 
figuration sequence, but the “mimetic tip” of each material arrives at different levels 
of that sequence. Classifying the architecture of Paleolithic caves as Gothic, as we 
did in the last chapter, was no coincidence since they share very particular qualities. 
Both consist of limestone, both are based on the architectural concept of the nave, 
both consist of limbs. And both go through the three stages of figuration, though 
they do this in very different ways. Since the cave is built by the interaction with 
water, first to shape the structure of the limestone, then to shape the form of the 
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stone, it never followed the traditional building stages of quarry, plan, and elevation. 
The three building phases are completely intermingled during the process of cave 
formation. In Heideggerian terms: while the water is cracking open the stone 
(Riss), liberating the stone while it remains in the darkness of the cave, the water 
simultaneously grinds and washes out the plan, the Grundriss, and in the process it 
moves vertically by creating the traces, bulgings, and profiles of the wall, the 
Aufriss. The quarry, plan, and elevation are not altogether absent, yet the order in 
which they appear is completely different than in a project built with human 
technology. While the stone-water is quarrying it is building too, and while it is 
building it is also sculpting, and while sculpting almost painting. Almost, that is, 
since the intermingling of the phases does not allow a fully mimetic transformation. 
With the processes of physis constantly present during the process, the course of 
mimesis cannot be fully deployed. Of course, this is only an issue from the 
viewpoint of architecture, even of architectural criticism; the moment we 
incorporate painting, dance, and percussion into the equation, the cave becomes 
the ideal model, i.e., ideal in the Platonic sense.
Obviously, since the Medieval Gothic depends on human technologies, it has to 
follow the three phases of quarry, plan, and elevation in that specific order as 
separate building phases. The limestone quarry is not unlike the cave, except that 
the stone is laid bare in full daylight: it is the earth cracked open (“quarry” translates 
in German as Steinbruch, “stone crack”), a Riss, what we have termed rupture. 
Building does not start with a plan, it starts with a yawning gap, in an act generally 
known as “breaking ground.” What arises from that gap occurs in the stages 
of prefiguration, figuration, and transfiguration that are strongly related to the 
building phases though as transitions, not by running exactly parallel. The 
prefiguration stage coincides with the transition of the quarry to the plan (Riss to 
Grundriss); figuration with the transition of the plan to the elevation (Grundriss 
to Aufriss), that is, with the elevation as an upward movement; the transfiguration 
level is that of appearance, the sideways movement of the elevation (Aufriss to 
Umriss). Cave architecture proceeds through the stages of figuration by transforming 
from a mineral state to an animal state. Architecture, as human technology, has 
often inserted the vegetable in this process, not always in between, and not always 
in the same form, again because figuration and soft-to-hard technologies are 
interdependent. There are fundamentally phenotechnical reasons for the presence 
of the vegetable in architecture, which we will have to discover and discuss as we go 
along. The study of the Medieval Gothic will explain many, not all, of those reasons. 
Going from prefiguration to figuration to transfiguration, the Gothic combines the 
mineral, vegetable, and animal in a very particular way. Similar to the cave model, 
we encounter on each figuration level a specific transition, and as with the cave 
stone is involved on each level, behaving more and more mimetically while it moves 
to the third stage, though never fully reaching the state of an image. Building is 
Bildung, a move toward the image, not the image (Bild) itself.
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We can now specify the three stages of the Medieval Gothic analogously to those 
of the “Cave Gothic” in their own specific manner. The first level of prefiguration is 
that of (a) the mineral-animal transformation, characterized by crystalline roughness 
with its many shifts and splittings in the specific order of an animal body by laying 
out limb-like structures. The second level of figuration we can identify as (b) the 
mineral-vegetable transformation, where the limbs of the first level have become 
smoother and bendable, stalk-like and capable of forming complex leaf-like 
traceries. And finally, the third level of transfiguration is that of (c) the mineral-floral 
transformation, where we find the configurations become ever more flower-like, 
such as the rose window, extended into a world of color and light, slowly shifting to 
sculpture and painting. Let us follow these three levels of Gothic figuration step by 
step and examine their intricacies and internal connections.
If we put the plans (“horizontal sections”) of the Paleolithic caves next to those 
of a few cathedrals, preferably in the middle stage of French and English Gothic 
development, we hardly have to mention the fact that they are different, having 
been produced by different technologies. The similarities, however, are remarkable. 
Both show a specific type of incremental downscaling of elements: every time 
something happens, something else happens within it, and again, and again. It is as 
if we are looking at a serrated knife or a mountain range, that is, we see as much 
continuity between elements as discrete elements protruding. It is a form of 
ruggedness or better, of ruggedness in ruggedness. First of all, as the first part of the 
term “mineral-animal transformation” suggests, this ruggedness is of a crystalline 
nature: it operates by way of straight, linear shifts and cuts. The cleaving techniques 
of the quarry proceed all the way to the geometry of the first phase. We only have 
to glance over the plans of the cathedrals and we observe that the breaking occurs 
in a specific order: from large linear volumes to ever smaller ones. It involves a 
process of limb formation,21 every time an element is broken it is broken into 
multiple smaller elements: the nave into transepts, the transepts into buttresses, the 
buttresses into pinnacles. The elements remain linear and limb-like while becoming 
ever thinner, in order to prepare for the next stage. The process alternates between 
torso-like continuities of multiplication interrupted by limb-like breakages and 
discontinuities. A rhythm of smoothness and roughness, what Ruskin called 
changefulness and savageness.22
Seen from this viewpoint, the Gothic does not vary fundamentally from other 
architectures. Indeed, like any bodily form, all architectural form can be defined by 
a specific “torso-limb index,” where the torso-part regulates the continuity of the 
massing, while the limb-part regulates the extensions, which could be “wings,” as 
we find them in a variety of styles in landscape- and garden-oriented architecture, 
or the spires and transepts of the Gothic, or smaller elements such as turrets, bay 
windows, chimneys, porticos and stairs, or various types of gables and roofs. In the 
Gothic, more specifically, we see that the rhythmicity of the alternating torso 
features and limb features occurs while they are decreasing in scale. We will never 
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find an expression of full-blown torsism such as the chests of classical architecture 
with its cornices and corners; on the contrary, every time there seems to be an 
opportunity for the volume to close up smoothly, it interrupts itself again to form 
limbs. Its rhythmic sequence or code would start with the nave splitting off 
sideways into double, sometimes quadruple transepts, and upward into double 
spires, followed by limb-buttresses and ending with pinnacles. As the comparison 
to a mountain range suggests, the form is defined by a fractalized principle: more 
and ever smaller extremities are splitting off. In short, while its geometry in this 
phase is defined by the crystalline geometry of minerals, its architectural form 
tends toward that of the animal body. Torso and limbs alternate, one to connect 
things smoothly, the other constantly breaking off in both the horizontal and the 
vertical direction. Looking at the vertical profile of a Gothic cathedral, it is clearly 
visible that the elevation does not simply shoot upwards as is usually stated; every 
step upward is followed by a collapse, creating a shape similar to that of a serrated 
knife or a stock market graph. Its morphological rules generate a typically jagged 
profile, a volume that cannot be described by a single, uninterrupted outline. Now, 
while this first stage of prefiguration largely defines the form and volume of the 
building, it is not nearly enough to explain its architecture. As said, there are very 
specific reasons for that.
Most striking is the fact that though prefiguration is based on the body plan of 
animals (where I include the body of Christ with the arms spread sideways and the 
legs held side by side), the body with its multiple limbs does not move. This seems 
an utterly superfluous, irrelevant, if not ridiculous remark in the context of 
buildings—nonetheless, it is essential. The distribution of limbs of an actual 
animal’s body—be it the wings of a bird, the fins of a fish, or the legs of a spider—is 
fundamentally defined by rough and sudden changes in form. In aesthetic terms: 
the body is moving away from beauty. However, this formal roughness is corrected 
on the nonformal level by the smoothness of animal motion and postural grace. 
The coordinated flexing of the joints; the harmonization of the moving parts in 
purposeful action; the intensity, gentleness, or ferocity of movement; in short, the 
“movable beauty” of which Schiller speaks, is not readily available to buildings, 
certainly not in the way it is in sculpture where the distinction between structure 
and form is less prominent. Here lies the difference between the limb architecture 
of the Gothic and that of cave architecture, which does have direct access to the 
level of sculpture. In the cave the formation of limbs coincides with their flexing: 
when the passages, halls, and naves split off, they do so while moving like tentacles, 
blurring the exact location of joints, as if it concerns the ultrasoft body of an 
octopus. The form of the limb and its movement coincide, since the cracking open 
of the rock occurs simultaneously with the washing out of the limestone by the 
flowing water. In the case of the Medieval Gothic, the movement does not coincide 
with the limb formation of the first phase, but takes place during the second phase, 
the stage of figuration.
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Exactly at this point Gothic architecture shifts from the category of the animal 
to that of the vegetable. Vegetal figuration opens up the route toward movement in 
the way contrapposto did for sculpture: not by making a thing move, but by having 
movement make a thing, and make it stand. The vegetal route loops the possible 
movement of limbs back to the stillness of the animal body. If the architecture 
would remain on the animal path it would be inexplicable why it takes on the shape 
of an animal body without being able to move about. Why would architecture ever 
identify itself with a dead animal? Vegetal figuration solves that problem. Whereas 
in the cave figuration can be fulfilled by painting, in the Gothic the architecture 
itself needs to transform. In Hegelian terms, the self-movement initiated in the 
prefiguration phase cannot be accomplished by the same means—in stark contrast 
to cave architecture, which is so brilliantly shaped by water, where shapes are 
anything but crystalline though wholly based on processes of crystallization. Cave 
architecture is wholly animalist: while it lays out the limbs it finds the animals’ 
movement, and while it records the motion it finds their image. The Gothic follows 
the cave model, but necessarily divides the material transitions between hard and 
soft differently over the figuration phases. The Cave Gothic is animalist and the 
Medieval Gothic vegetalist for no other reason than that the Paleolithic waters have 
shaped both the stone and the form of the cave, whereas in medieval, lithic times 
the waters have shaped the stone, but not the architecture, an act that has to be 
fulfilled by the technology of carving, which needs to introduce movement precisely 
at the moment of elevation, and thereby necessarily doing so in the form of vegetal 
figuration.
Almost all pre-modern architecture is rerouted via the vegetal path; in itself 
there is nothing specifically Gothic in that. The intimate, millennia-long 
relationship with botany is one of the great mysteries of architecture, and should 
be viewed in the back-and-forth switching between internal member-parts and 
external member-limbs of a nonmoving body. It is the problem that Vitruvius, 
who made continuous use of the term membrum, never fully recognized, and 
fundamentally the reason why his proportional model of architecture, the 
Vitruvian Man, fails to explain the commensurability of the limbs in the required 
context of “posture and motion,” to put it in terms of Burke’s definition of grace. 
There is simply no way we can understand the proportions of members without 
their movement, or the way they move without their commensurability. On the 
one hand, Vitruvius showed great interest in grace—his central term venustas 
means exactly that, and not beauty—but, on the other hand, the Vitruvian Man is 
utterly and completely dead, tellingly described by the Roman theoretician as lying 
on its back, even though Leonardo drew it as a standing figure, yet on this occasion 
not in contrapposto. In order to guide the external movement back to its internal 
parts and turn stance into activity, architects are therefore bound to design 
buildings as animal bodies in vegetal form. The fact that we have completely lost 
sight of this problem over the last hundred years either indicates a massive, 
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collective form of architectural dementia, or some kind of radical resetting of 
technologies. It is no secret that I am opting for the latter conclusion. If that is true, 
those new technologies need to be rethought in the framework of the interfiguration 
between the mineral, vegetable, and animal. We will get to that later in the chapter.
What sets the Gothic apart from other architectures is that its switching from 
the mineral-crystalline mode to the mineral-vegetable mode occurs over a much 
broader range, with reverberations in both directions. I discussed this assertion 
extensively in the first chapter of The Sympathy of Things, “The Digital Nature of 
Gothic,” where I introduced the notions of figuration and configuration.23 The 
central claim is that the Gothic does not admit to the traditional separation of 
structure and ornament as work and by-work, or ergon and parergon. Most 
architectures make use of the vegetable only at the final stage in the route from 
massing to structure to ornament, leaving the first two in a wholly crystalline state. 
The Gothic introduces movement much earlier, at the structural stage: it not only 
makes use of leaves and petals, but brings in stalks and stems to cross over from 
bendable to rigid. Obviously, the bendable occurs at the figural level, not at the 
literal, a shift from soft to hard that is wholly facilitated by carving technologies and 
limestone. The flexing that routinely occurs at the level of ornament (scrolls, volutes, 
meanders, acanthus leaves, etc.) happens here at that of structure: bundles of stalks 
unraveling and bending, then again interweaving and webbing into large vaults 
with intricate patterns. The way the Gothic makes use of plant behavior enables it 
to position its architecture in a loop between movement and object, and approaches 
therefore classical sculpture’s explorations of contrapposto and posture, yet on a 
far larger and communal scale. Posture means a body being still by moving its 
members; it lies at the heart of the contrapuntal notion of the figure. In the Gothic 
the complete transition area of the middle stage of figuration is governed by the 
mineral-vegetable transformation.
We encounter its full power in the window traceries, where in contrast to the 
bundled columns and webbed vaults, we see the switching back and forth between 
structural and ornamental occurring in the form of stalks as well as leaves. 
Generally, we can analyze the columns, fans, and vaults of the naves and aisles with 
the basic figures of the J-figure, a shaft and an arc; the C-figure, an arc; and the 
S-figure, two inversely connected arcs. The three basic figures are all variable in 
their shapes, for instance, the J-figure can lengthen via the shaft and deepen via the 
arc, the C-figure can open less or more, and the S-figure can be deep or shallow, 
even symmetrical or asymmetrical.24 This variation is fundamental for the next 
level of figuration, and in most Gothic examples there are at least five levels in the 
figuration phase alone, which we are unable to discuss here in full detail. In the 
whole body of architecture history it is impossible to find a more sophisticated 
notion of figuration. We should not forget that the word “tracery” shows its close 
kinship with the figure, as it is derived from the French trait, the word we discussed 
in the context of Eugen Petersen’s Zug.25 To establish the exact geometry of their 
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buildings, the Gothic architects from medieval France made use of a special 
form of stereotomy, l’art du trait, where the line was not merely the result of 
intersecting volumes by means of projection, but the actual generator of volumetric 
geometry.26 The line had its own shape, being embodied by the rib, which we 
encounter on all levels of design: in the bundled columns, the transitions fanning 
outward to the vaults, in the webbed vaults themselves, and the window traceries, 
which are highly complex despite their two-dimensionality. In window tracery, 
and especially in the highly intricate weaving and interlacing of rose windows, 
we see figures pairing up, then making small groups and again complex mini-
configurations. These in-between stages of figuration behave again as entities by 
repeating, mirroring, or rotating. For the non-expert, the most recognizable pairs 
are the ogive and the ogee; the ogive consisting of a mirrored J-figure and the ogee 
a mirrored S-figure, while in the category of small groups the trefoil and the 
quatrefoil are the best known, respectively made up of three and four C-figures. 
The number of variations of the trefoil are smaller than that of the quatrefoil. In 
addition to being made up of three C-figures, the trefoil can also be constructed 
by three ogives or ogees. In the case of the quatrefoil, we can replace one of 
the C-figures with an ogive or ogee, or keep two C-figures opposite and replace the 
other two with opposing ogees; this can be repeated until all the C-figures are 
replaced by four ogees.
Yet, with such combinatorial descriptions we barely get to the heart of the matter, 
which is that figures interact with one another and not with any possible background 
as is the common view of the figure. This we can observe especially well in the case 
of the middle-scale figures that go by French names such as mouchette or soufflet. 
The majority of the figures on this scale level have not even been identified by 
architectural historians. At the base level, the figure consists of a single line, generally 
materialized in the form of the rib, but at the moment several ribs start to configure 
and form a closed contour, they in their turn start to act as figures, figures we would 
usually define as background. Although these middle-scale figures are enclosed 
bodies and not single lines anymore, they are never allowed to become torsos, they 
will always break into new figures acting as limbs, mostly by means of what is called 
the thorn-like cusp, probably the core figure of the Gothic. In the process of the 
continuous interrelating of figures, new figures are constructed in such a way that 
the background disappears. Interacting figures never leave undefined space in 
between, nothing can be left unfigurated. A simple figure-to-configuration schema 
would rely too much on an additive hierarchy, obscuring the fact that all figures 
ranging from single to complex configurations can exist at all scale levels in nested 
conditions. The intermingling of various scales of figures and the mixing of line-
figures and contour-figures makes it impossible to say if we are looking at a network 
of lines or a mosaic of patches. In terms of language and logography, one could say 
that in the Gothic there is never a clear distinction between letters, syllables, words, 
and sentences; words can break up into mini-sentences, and parts of sentences start 
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functioning as words. Evidently, explaining the powers of Gothic figuration would 
require a separate book filled with thousands of diagrams. It must be said though, 
that figuration is completely overlooked by architectural historians; without 
exception they apply analyses derived from classicist iconography, based on an 
elementarist methodology that by definition hampers any understanding of 
variation, both on the level of smoothness and of roughness. It is a miraculous and 
highly technical art that exceeds by far the standard nomenclature, and only a 
comprehensive “Grammar of Gothic” would be able to show all intricacies and 
stages of variation, an exegesis that would surely exceed the established notions of 
grammar and syntax.
For our present purposes, the exact ins and outs of its figurate behavior are less 
critical than the question how the vegetal mediates between the mineral and 
animal. It has troubled many philosophers that plants are alive as well as immobile, 
since the principles of life are based on consciousness and those of consciousness 
on self-movement. Hegel, for instance, denies plants a Self because of their “linear 
growth,” what he famously called “bad infinity,” the inadequacy of plants to close 
themselves off from other selves.27 For Hegel, plants are too “selfless”: “The plant . . . 
does not attain to a being-for-self but merely touches the boundary-line of 
individuality.”28 He is pushing his anti-Romanticism a bit too far here: when plants 
are selfless, it does not mean they have no Self, on the contrary, one has to have a 
Self to be selfless. Generosity is not an act of giving oneself away. Certainly, plants 
are examples of linearity, but that does not mean they are line segments, cut off at 
the bottom and the top. Plants are as much networks themselves as the networks 
they build between each other. In that sense, plants absolutely move, they move 
locally as Darwin already proved in the Power of Movement in Plants, as well as 
growing flourishing relations between each other and other selves. The generally 
assumed literalism of locomotion is based on very slippery thinking, at least as 
slippery as the literalism of pure standstill. A sharp division between the two leads 
immediately to infinite regress, where a nonmoving entity needs to be postulated 
to move its body, and again, and again. Spatial displacement is not the sole proof of 
movement’s presence. Our discussion of the postural figure in the first chapter 
showed that before a body sets itself in motion, movement already has to be present 
during standstill, otherwise the transition would be impossible. Literal movement 
relies on non-literal movement, that is the crux of readiness and the reason it is 
based in figuration. Michael Marder, who discusses Hegel’s critique of linearity in 
his book Plant-Thinking, demonstrates clearly how the plant’s selfless generosity 
drives its propensity for networking and flourishing:
Plant-soul is a concrete expression of such division of and at the origin—the 
kind of primordial generosity that gives itself to all other creatures, animates 
them with this gift, parts against itself, and in this parting and falling apart 
invites the participation of beings in the act of living.29
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The movement of plants is a movement in the plant and between them, not of the 
plant, and is based on a non-literal, figurate movement, one of figures turning into 
still configurations. The nature of Gothic, then, is a vegetal nature.
In the Aristotelian order of things, vegetal life fits neatly between mineral 
immobility and animal self-movement. That is not what is occurring in the Gothic. 
In the shifts from massing to structure and structure to ornament, the Gothic does 
not follow the mineral-vegetable-animal route; the positions are shuffled. The 
mineral and animal are connected first by creating an animal body, almost fully 
consisting of limbs, limbs that withhold their movement to release it on the vegetal 
level, enabling the plant to interlace and build connections. The non-movement of 
the building’s animal body coincides with the figural movement of the plant. In the 
Gothic, plants behave as animals and animals as plants. This must be the reason 
why in medieval times so many books appeared with illustrations of plants 
growing animals as flowers; of intricate knotworks ending in human heads; of 
humans striking root and growing leaves; of trees transforming into animals; or of 
three hares chasing each other while linked up by the ears in a trefoil.
The Lithuanian art historian Jurgis Baltrušaitis published several extraordinary 
books on the topic.30 In page after page he shows and discusses images of how 
the vegetable turns into the human, the human into the animal, the animal into the 
vegetable, all via the technical acts of figuration and configuration. And the word 
“technical” means “phenotechnical,” structures turning into appearances. Such 
constructs go beyond the mere exploration of the fantastic, a notion that would 
misplace their phenotechnology in the category of imagery and imagination. It 
concerns a fundamental equalizing of movement and stillness. Why? Because when 
the one can change into the other, they must exist without hierarchy, that is, without 
the Aristotelian hierarchy of souls and the Hegelian hierarchy of Spirit. Change is 
exchange. The moment an opening has been created between the dead-stillness of 
minerals and the self-movement of animals, the passage becomes operative in both 
directions. The notion of “stone coming to life,” which is fundamentally a vitalist 
paradigm, is to be mirrored by a reversed paradigm, a “mortalism.” Mirroring means 
not choosing between one and the other, but a mutual absorption of one another in a 
constant mimetic oscillation. With the pair of them working in resonance, we would 
finally arrive at an understanding of the real powers of appearance, namely the 
flickering between death and life; again, not as an eternal suspense in limbo, but as 
continuous exchange.
Probably this is the right moment to start asking ourselves why the Medieval 
Gothic became so inextricably entangled with the Romantic Gothic. At first glance, 
a larger contrast scarcely seems possible. The Medieval Gothic is that of St. Thomas 
who theorized claritas, of Abbot Suger who built St. Denis and its stained-glass 
windows, or of Louis IX who built Sainte-Chapelle with the most beautiful rose 
window of all the Gothic. (Suddenly, we find ourselves surrounded by saints, who, I 
must say, are experts in the exchange of death and appearance, as most of them have 
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been martyred and carry a halo around their head.) In sharp contrast, we encounter 
in the Romantic Gothic a plethora of graveyards, werewolves, Doppelgänger, 
vampires, and hypnotism. If they would have told Abbot Suger that at the start of the 
third millennium people would associate the Gothic with occultism, black-leather 
dress code, body piercings, and ghost stories, he would probably not have survived 
it. Is this purely an accident of history? Surely not, though the underlying reasons 
stretch far beyond the iconology of ruins, full moons, and open graves.
The Gothic is not an architecture that in any way flirts with death or represents 
mortality in the manner of classic architectures of death with their vacant walls 
draped in heavy shadows and the obligatory monumentalism of the sublime.31 It is 
not an architecture of the pure gap or the abyss, the uncanny or the eerie. The 
insurmountable problem of presenting us with the mere gap is that appearances 
again need to appeal to human consciousness and imagination. One would hardly 
be able to speak of exchange or sharing, let alone generosity. When pure absence 
haunts us, we fill it in with images. The Medieval Gothic goes much further than 
that; like the Cave Gothic it presents us with both the gap and the things that 
appear from the shaping of the gap; absence and presence simultaneously in a 
constant flickering relationship. The light of the Gothic is that of opalescence and 
iridescence, not that of white uninterrupted daylight—it flickers intermittently 
with variable frequencies. In short, the Romantic intuition of the Gothic should be 
considered at least partially as authentic, since it taps into a crucial aspect of its 
phenotechnology.
Surely the Gothic senses the presence of death, yet not as tucked away in the 
darkness of shadows. It is death itself that shines, the primary source of what 
Donna Haraway calls “Christian realism,”32 which we encounter most strongly in 
the form of the relic, the venerated remains of the martyr or saint. The mere 
presence of a shriveled, mummified body part such as a severed toe or hand—
limbs in any case, even membra Christi33—of a martyr is not enough to make the 
object shimmer and radiate: the relic vibrates in resonance with the absence of the 
rest of the body.34 Without the sacrificial death of the saint the relic would be 
meaningless. Kept in reliquaries or monstrances, the body part is often made 
visible behind a little window surrounded by a golden halo or nimbus, a practice 
that originated in late antiquity and its obsession with the colored light of 
gemstones and gold. Whereas we observe a reduced use of gold leaf and mosaic 
compared to other architectures, the emphasis in the Gothic shifted to the use of 
stained glass, which, in a way, turns the whole cathedral into a reliquary. In this 
combination of building, color, and radiance, we immediately recognize the 
iconography of the rose window, where the limestone reaches its limit in an 
exuberance of figuration and configuration to transfigure into pure coloration. At 
this point it is impossible to say whether we are looking at petals or flames, that is, 
at flourishing or perishing. The rose window presents us with an image that, to 
truly understand the Gothic, should be superimposed with that of death: the relics 
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on the altar; the billions of dead sea creatures buried in the limestone; the 
innumerous tombstones spread out over the floor turned nameless by centuries of 
devout shuffling; the dead saint the building is devoted to; and of course in every 
possible corner the expiring body of Christ with its face covered in blood and the 
gaping wound at its side35—everywhere we look corporeal death is surrounded by 
that bright, multicolored halo.
It is clear: with these last paragraphs we have started to consider the principles 
of the Gothic’s third and final stage of figuration, that of transfiguration or the 
mineral-floral transformation. Compared with the horizontal lotus flower of 
Hinduism, the Gothic offers us the vertical flower of the rose window. It fulfills the 
figurational route of Gothic plant life: moving from the roots absorbing the soil’s 
dissolved minerals to the structural stems and stalks, upward to the distribution of 
leaves, to terminate in the colored flower. After all, “figurate” means “florid.” Earlier, 
I nominated the flower as the plant’s means of transport: its appearance is the way 
it penetrates the environment, by color and odor, and making those surroundings 
bend toward it. With a subtle difference: in the case of the Gothic cathedral it 
concerns an inward movement, not outward. The flower turns inward, looping the 
plant back onto itself. At the exterior the rose window is difficult, if not impossible 
to understand; because of its perfect roundness it barely harmonizes with the 
linear structure,36 which goes against the nature of tracery. Looking from the 
inside, everything changes: the tracery turns black against the sunlight, the colors 
of the stained glass start to shine brilliantly, and the enclosed images slowly become 
visible. It is as if the plant proves Hegel wrong by contemplating its own flower. It 
is true that the Gothic world is filled with light, as is commonly proclaimed, though 
not the light of reason and transparency. Its luminosity is that of thick light, a form 
of light that, as Umberto Eco notes, “freely diffuses itself and is the source of 
motion. It penetrates the bowels of the earth, forming its minerals and seed of its 
life, for it possesses the energy of celestial bodies.”37
Now that the Gothic has demonstrated the pivotal role of death, radiance and 
luminosity can be regarded as being deeply entangled with spectrality, a term to be 
understood in a sense of shining, combining the color spectrum and the dead’s 
presence. Spectrality establishes the meaning of radiance as a looping, double 
movement from stance to appearance and back from movement to stillness, i.e., 
death. It is the ultimate consequence of weakness’ crucial role in the turn between 
stance and shining. The mineral-floral transformation works in both directions, 
from limestone to color and from color to limestone. In contrast to Derrida’s 
concept of the spectral, death becomes part of presence and visibility, a form of 
hypervisibility, a seeing beyond seeing, in fact, what saints call “vision.”38 (We can’t 
really “see” radiance; the closest we get to an experience of beauty is a cascading of 
images, a sort of blurring effect, as if leaking from the figure’s blur.) In his Specters 
of Marx, Derrida opts for the spectral as “non-presence,” a strategy of the sublime 
that seeks to deconstruct phenomenological presence, yet the French philosopher 
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completely overlooks the fact that in doing so he grants the same central position 
to human consciousness.39 The only difference is that where phenomenologists see 
presence, he sees absence. Radiance, on the other hand, is a reversal of these two 
interchangeable positions, namely by putting the power of appearance in the 
hands of things, yet—since that relies on the gift structure—this power is obtained 
by sacrifice. As we saw so many times over the last chapters, their existence as 
thing-appearances, i.e., as figures, is wholly based in weakness, a positive weakness 
that fosters presence. Staring into absence, seeing-through appearances into the 
paradigmatic abyss of the sublime, is precisely not what the Gothic entails. Instead 
of linking the spectral to the uncanny, the Gothic links it to bliss, instead of 
darkness to iridescence, and instead of absence to flickering presence.40 There is no 
darkness, just the quivering brokenness of light or, in a word, color.
An important difference emerges here between the spectral and the ghostly, 
since the category of the former contains the latter, yet not the reverse. The spectral 
fuses fact and fiction—the literal meaning of the term “figure,” as we recall from 
Auerbach’s definition—whereas the ghostly is fiction only. The spectral is the very 
structure of visibility; ghosts we merely imagine. Ghosts tell us we are going to die, 
specters that we are half-dead already. The ultimate form of solace: we are never 
fully dead and never fully alive, respectively a vitalist and a mortalist clause. Ruskin 
called this “the veil of strange, intermediate being.”41 This fused world is one of 
thickness, unexpectedly merging with the medieval concept of claritas, meaning 
“resplendence” or “brilliance” and not to be confused with clarity. Claritas denotes 
the rule of color: “Things are beautiful when they are brightly colored,” wrote 
St. Thomas.42 Color is thick light, light as fog and as obstacle. If we are looking for an 
alternative to human consciousness; this is it. Color as the very foundation and 
substance of the real. To fully grasp the beauty of rose windows, one should gaze at 
those from the late Gothic styles of the Rayonnant and the Flamboyant, meaning 
the radiating and the flaming. From opalescence and iridescence we have moved to 
incandescence. The rose seems to pulsate, sometimes to rotate, ejecting its saints 
over the interior in the starkest color schemes. While spinning, the traceried wheel 
leaves its mineral-vegetal skeleton behind to pass into a state of pure, configured 
color. Of course, the rose window is a halo. Nothing as uncompromising as 
the Gothic laws of color: no gradation, no subtle harmonies, just pure color 
supplied directly by the color wheel, a practice we recognize from color use in 
flags, sports, and heraldry where the brightening occurs because of the internal 
contrasts, not because of the quality of the colors themselves. They are the colors of 
agōn, of fierceness and competition. The rose window exhibits the kaleidoscopic, 
multicolored appearance of what the Greeks denoted with the word kōsmos, a word 
that signifies universe as well as adornment, as in cosmetics. In the Gothic world, 
the collapse of structure and ornament applies to everything.
When Hegel launched his final assault in The Phenomenology of Spirit on plant 
life, and implicitly on Romanticism and Hinduism—“The innocence of the flower 
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religion, which is merely the self-less idea of self, gives place to the earnestness of 
warring life, to the guilt of animal religions”43—he probably did not realize that the 
central icon of his own religion was that of the rose that had nestled itself between 
the animal and the mineral.
automatism and the Ferric
The history of the Gothic—among which we can now count the Cave Gothic, 
Medieval Gothic, and the Romantic Gothic—proceeds with its recurrence, or 
better, with its fatal recurrence in the form of nineteenth-century revivalism. I am 
not using the word “fatal” because of its revivalism or because it took the shape of 
some unattainable dream. On the contrary, the fact that it shaped itself as a dream, 
Pugin’s and Ruskin’s dream mainly, is exactly what makes it so perfect. Revivalism 
always oscillates between death and a certain glorifying light, which fits with lithic 
psychology, the coming to light of fossils, of hidden imagery, the past breaking into 
the present by way of a rupture. It is historicism in its most transcendent form: as 
if nothing happened between now and then. The problem, and its inherent fatality, 
lies in its phenotechnical discord, in viewing the Medieval Gothic as a perfect 
image to be enacted by fast-forwarding six hundred years without embedding the 
image in its new technological context. Of course, both Pugin and Ruskin partially 
viewed the implementation of revivalist Gothic as a form of resistance against the 
increasing influence of iron on the shape of things; a dialectics bound to fail. A 
more elegant hypothesis would be that the new technologies of the nineteenth 
century indirectly caused the dream of revivalism, like the numerous other dreams 
it caused such as the historical novel or even the notion of dreaming itself. It would 
be no exaggeration to say that the nineteenth century was the century of dreams; 
never were more paintings made of sleeping men or women, and never were more 
books published on theories of dreaming. Nonetheless, such a hypothesis would 
still be dialectical, a form of resistance, yet a more genial version than the dialectics 
of stone and iron.
Phenotechnically revivalism failed to engage its version of the Gothic with the 
new technologies of iron and steel; it merely attached its lithic imagery onto the 
iron, such as the railway stations with their brick fronts and their glass and iron 
structures, covering the trains and platforms. It lacked a ferric psychology, i.e., iron’s 
ability to dream up images, not ours. We tend to think of iron as the ultimate 
material of hardness and strength, and at first sight the images of trains, steam 
engines, and bridges seem to support this, but let us not forget that these are images 
of iron when it has cooled off and left the mold. The true psychology of iron is that 
of a liquidity and softness with more mimetic powers than the limestone of the 
cave and the Gothic. Ferric psychology is the psychology of metamorphosis. No 
wonder that the study of dreams took such a flight during the nineteenth century. 
Iron is the stuff dreams are made of. The “mimetic tip” of iron reaches deep into the 
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processes of figuration, much deeper than what is possible with limestone. 
Fundamentally, we are discussing the technology of cast iron in this argument, 
since wrought iron is reworked over numerous times by going back and forth 
between softening and hardening, making it independent of a mold and therefore 
less mimetic. Though Hephaestus was capable of forging iron as if it were cast, 
making shapes take on the form of dogs, lions, or maidens, this was because, as 
Mircea Eliade said, “the furnaces are, as it were, a new matrix, an artificial uterus 
where the ore completes its gestation,”44 offering a morphogenetic view of molding 
and modeling based on the etymological kinship of mater (mother), matrix (mold), 
and matter.45 According to Eliade, there always existed “a close connection between 
the art of the smith, the occult sciences (shamanism, magic, healing, etc.) and the 
art of the song, dance, and poetry,” as if redirecting the very ingredients used in the 
Paleolithic caves toward different materials.46 The shift from a lithic to a ferric 
psychology seems more than just a possibility if only the process would incorporate 
more of the soft stage of iron.
Cast iron was already in use long before the nineteenth century, though the 
relationship between the softness of the hot material and its mold was not 
fundamentally different from Baroque stucco, for instance, except for the fact that 
stucco requires a substructure—the reason why the Baroque is an art of the 
theater—whereas cast iron is capable of supporting considerable loads. When 
finally used in a structural capacity, the mold was still viewed as a dialectic anti-
form, as a hardness functioning as the receptacle of softness, with little exchange 
between them. This all changes with Art Nouveau, where the notion of softness 
and malleability transforms the conception of the mold itself. After all, the mold 
needs to be cast as well, shifting the notion of maternal matrix and conception to 
a moment before the actual casting of the iron. Doing so, it shifted mimesis a few 
steps back in the process toward physis. When keeping in mind that the casting 
process advances from terracotta model to wax to iron cast, this means that the 
character of the wax starts to influence the shape of the mold that allows for a 
sculptural treatment of architectural elements. Not sculptural as a necessarily 
artistic or formal exploration, but as we have been employing the term throughout 
this book, as the figural combination of weakness and strength based on the expert 
knowledge of posture. In architecture, like in sculpture, whatever comes out of the 
mold, be it a railing, a lamppost, or a column, needs to be able to stand. While 
the mold plays an important role, it remains that of a go-between; the true 
conception is that of the wax gestating in the iron, or in our terms, the wax 
inhabiting the iron. In other words, a procedure based in the double meaning of 
conception: the standing is conceptualized by the wax while the iron conceives the 
wax in the mold.
The realism we have been touching upon must by definition be a technological 
realism, i.e., as much a question of physis as of mimesis. Or, as Walter Benjamin so 
fittingly observed:
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Jugendstil [Art Nouveau] is the second attempt on the part of art to come to 
terms with technology. The first attempt was realism . . . Jugendstil no longer 
saw itself threatened by the competing technology.47
Benjamin’s unfinished Arcades Project (in German: Passagen-Werk) is one of the 
few theoretical works engaging with Art Nouveau. The book clearly shows the two 
sides of Benjamin’s relationship with Art Nouveau: while his head is in the 
twentieth century and its modernism, his heart lies with the nineteenth. He is 
fascinated by its architecture, the forms, the posters, the fetishism, the makeup, the 
glowing objects, the crowds implied by the structure of the city, and the labyrinthic 
character of the arcades which transverse and undermine the network of the 
Hausmannian boulevards of Paris. The arcades are public interiors, just as Art 
Nouveau is an art of the interior, the reason why the house is the largest object that 
Art Nouveau could devise. As Dolf Sternberger, an author who Benjamin quotes 
numerous times, wrote: “the most characteristic work of Jugendstil is the house.”48 
Yet, despite the stark contrast to the Gothic and its revivalist successor, which were 
both capable of conceiving enormous buildings, Art Nouveau remains a Gothic 
project in every possible sense. The image of the cathedral permeated the whole of 
the French nineteenth century, from Victor Hugo—famously stating that “the book 
ends all this”49—all the way up to Rodin and Monet, an image that only starts to 
fade with Marcel Proust who began his intellectual life as a passionate Ruskinian, 
comparing his multivolume In Search of Lost Time to a cathedral.50 Art Nouveau’s 
Gothic nature is exhibited in many ways, the most important of which are the 
vegetative notion of figuration and, at the level of transfiguration, that same typical 
inversion of the flower turning inward. The house of Art Nouveau—in England 
called the “House Beautiful”51—is stuffed with flowers, literally and figuratively, 
and in every possible form of figuration. When Sternberger referred to the scene in 
Ovid’s Metamorphoses where the dead body of Narcissus transfigures into a 
flower,52 declaring it the core principle of Art Nouveau’s project, he was being more 
accurate than any other author on the subject, before or after him.
Compared to the Medieval Gothic, we detect a marked difference in Art 
Nouveau’s version, namely that the latter has more direct access to the vegetal level, 
as if the iron ore excavated from the mines instantly adapts to plant life because of 
its powers of metamorphosis and mimesis. Stone still plays a role in the transitions, 
but compared with what Art Nouveau wants to achieve only in a minor role. 
Indeed, the overwhelming presence of iron, glass, and ceramics proves that for Art 
Nouveau stone could not deliver the required level of figuration. The iron arrives 
at the construction level almost as liquid as the water in the caves, enabling the 
figuration process to start immediately, skipping the phase of prefiguration. Not 
that Art Nouveau denies the existence of the Riss, the rupture stays present, yet not 
in crystalline form. The Art Nouveau house remains closer to the model of the cave 
than its medieval and revivalist predecessors.
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The figuration process consists in the case of Art Nouveau of two stages, not of 
three: a figuration phase and a transfiguration phase. The first phase, which guides 
the movement upwards from plan to elevation, and therefore by definition of a 
structural nature, concerns (a) the ferric-vegetable transformation, a phase we see 
occurring at the start of every object, be it a doorframe, the frame of a picture, a 
railing, a column, and even doorknobs, table legs, chairs, anything really. The 
second phase, moving sideways from elevation to appearance, we call (b) the 
ceramic-floral transformation, for lack of a better term, because the transition 
occurs on so many material levels. Whereas ceramics is the most important 
material at this stage, we encounter glass, wallpaper, paintings, wooden and metal 
objects transmuting into what we can only call spirits: peacocks, elves, dragonflies, 
butterflies, nymphs, and all types of flowers. We should not hesitate to use the term 
spirits, as we have done increasingly over the course of the last chapters. In this 
case, we could even speak of tutelary spirits: each thing presents itself attended by 
a guardian or intermediary; even the smallest objects arrive accompanied.
The figurations we encounter during the transformation of the iron into the 
vegetable are of a particular character we do not find in any other architecture, 
even when essentially Gothic in nature. Although based on the general motif of 
the tendril and the scroll, there are significant differences. The tendril figure is 
usually applied in the form of Beiwerk and parergon: the element is doing no 
structural work whatsoever and purely curls away as a sign of pleasure and leisure. 
In Art Nouveau, on the other hand, the tendril is an inseparable part of a longer 
element, an element that often starts out straight and even vertical. In art history, 
the figures are often referred to as whiplash-figures, a name that is chosen well, 
since the figure starts thick and strong while weakening and increasing its 
curvature along the way up. Yet, the figure is more complex than that. While the 
name “whiplash” indicates a single line following such a trajectory, we invariably 
encounter them as bundled, i.e., as a tight straight figure at the bottom that starts 
to unravel while slowly curving upwards, splitting up in multiple, increasingly 
curved, loose ends that constantly intersect with one another. It is no accident that 
Art Nouveau was obsessed with hair, especially long, women’s hair and wet hair. 
The posters of Alphonse Mucha, for instance, show extraordinarily complex forms 
of figuration: the strands of hair alternately merge into thick bundles to split up 
into thinner strands, fully unraveling to then start interlacing again. What looks at 
first like the very image of looseness and chance, exhibits complex structural 
behavior that exceeds the simplistic nuts-and-bolts elementarism of engineering.
The Gothic model is clearly present here: bundling at the bottom of the column, 
fanning out at the top to then interlace with other strands—the behavior of the 
figures is as much structural as it is ornamental. Gothic, yes, with the important 
difference in the number of figuration phases. The Gothic is based on a three-stage 
figuration process that includes prefiguration, and therefore acknowledges and 
incorporates the gap, that fundamental room between us and things which allows 
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those things to appear. That room appears to change with Art Nouveau. Certainly, it 
is not without a gap; that would be the house of pure comfort, where there is no 
difference between things and us, with things serving us so well—ergonomically—
that we cannot distinguish anymore between the master of the house and the things 
that serve him or her. Nor is it a house of discomfort, of the uncanny, where in our 
confrontation with the abyssal gap we feel haunted and start fantasizing about 
seeing ghosts. How does Art Nouveau approach this? When walking around in an 
Art Nouveau house it is remarkable how much the house exudes an atmosphere of 
being submerged, with every figure bending and curling in slow motion, even 
yielding and stretching out toward one another.53 Art Nouveau wholly acknowledges 
the necessity of the gap, it just fills it with water, figuratively speaking, by taking the 
notion of Spielraum as “spilling room” as literally as possible. The phase of rupture 
and groundbreaking coincides with the liquidity of the iron, and in its wake the 
liquidity of glass, clay, and paint. Instead of the whiplash or hair, a better image to 
identify Art Nouveau’s central figure might be that of a water plant: tied to the 
bottom, standing vertically, it starts swaying and curling while going upward and 
switching to a fully horizontal mode of swirling at the top. At no point can we say 
where the transition of ergon to parergon occurs, because there is none: ornament 
finds a depth here that pervades the whole aqueous space, turning space immediately 
into a mental state or mood. One could not wish for a better scenario of figuration’s 
thing-appearance switch. To draw a diagram of an Art Nouveau house, one would 
have to draw it as an aquarium filled with linear beings that are fixed at one end 
while free to move and explore at the other.
As noted above, we encounter a persistent obsession with sleep and dreams at 
the end of the nineteenth century: the room, now filled with water, turns into a 
medium, that is, a room where the relations between ourselves and between us and 
things are of the same nature and part of the same world. Everything is intermediate. 
Not a dreamworld in the sense that we are asleep and positioned horizontally, 
dreaming up our vertical walls as illusory fantasies of security. No, we are definitely 
vertical, we walk, talk, work, eat, drink, but as sleepwalkers, as if under hypnosis. 
Art Nouveau, the art of the somnambulic.54 Forms refuse to leave their molds, 
mirrors and matrices, as if floating in amniotic fluid. The ideological head of 
Surrealism, André Breton, went so far as to expand the notion of the medium:
It seemed to me worthwhile to bring together, in an issue of the journal 
containing several admirable specimens of Jugendstil art, a certain number of 
mediumistic designs . . . In fact, one is immediately struck by similarities between 
these two modes of expression. What is Jugendstil, I am tempted to ask, but an 
attempt to generalize and to adapt mediumistic design, paintings, and sculpture 
to dwellings and furniture? . . . It could be maintained that these two enterprises 
are actually conceived under the same sign, which might well be that of the 
octopus: “the octopus,” as Lautréamont has said, “with the silky gaze.”55
36697.indb   140 15/05/2020   15:50
FiGurate and SpectraL architecture      141
For us, the Sign of the Octopus could not be more relevant: a fully submerged 
body consisting of a head extended by limbs only, without any proper torso to 
speak of, as well as being a master of mētis and shape-shifting. Nothing more cave-
like than the octopus, nothing more octopedal than the cave. The notion of a 
medium means the lack of ground is all around you in the form of water, with the 
octopus swirling its tentacles like an uprooted plant. Breton’s use of the word 
“mediumistic” indicates a form of automatic drawing, placing the origin of design 
in the hands of a spiritualist medium. His article “Le message automatique,” 
published in a 1933 edition of the Surrealist journal Minotaure, illustrates the text 
with many forms of automatic drawings, some of them containing as much 
automatic writing as drawing.56 Odd maybe, but the logical conclusion to the 
notion of a medium: not only do the objects and the inhabitants swim in the same 
sphere, but the architect drawing those objects must have been part of that sphere 
beforehand: “the experienced artist or draftsman knows that the tracing of a line or 
a curve often falls within the domain of involuntary automatic actions.”57
Breton was unusually perceptive in his comparison of Art Nouveau’s figuration 
to automatic drawing, yet he dwelt too heavily on the line’s weakness, its tendency 
to explore all directions, scrolls intersecting with more scrolls, forms yielding to 
other forms like “spirits dressed in their fluid costumes.”58 For instance, when we 
look at Hector Guimard’s cast iron forms such as the famous railings and lampposts 
for the Paris Métro, we observe a more complex and contrapuntal model of 
weakness than the straightforward crystallization of a liquid state into a rigid form. 
Breton overemphasized the contribution of the wax to the inner state of cast iron. 
Looking at Guimard’s lines, we see a stretching out and self-elevation as well as 
directionless swirling. Indeed, we see them working together: the ironwork bends 
and flexes while standing up. It is not in a state of drunken dérive. The lines split 
and curve to find each other; behaving like the Gothic stalks and stems, the ribbing 
allows them to split off, pick up another element, or split off to incorporate the 
armature of a lamp. In fact, their weakening is a strategy of strength, a form of 
cunning: the waxiness of the iron coincides fully with its powers of framing and 
standing. Compare this to, say, Pollock’s dripping techniques applied to his action 
paintings. There we first observe the liquid dripped and splashed over the 
horizontally positioned canvas, the arabesque lines intersecting by chance, to then, 
after it has dried, be turned into the vertical position of a painting hanging on the 
wall. Two dimensions conceptually kept apart. In Guimard’s Gothic, they are 
interdependent: the weakening of the iron shapes the material via figuration into a 
state allowing it to stand. Art Nouveau’s figuration enables the horizontal plan to 
turn into the vertical elevation, a tropic turning that uses softening to construct 
stance. It follows the contrapuntal paradigm of the figure, where the tropism equals 
a turning into structure, thus making the ornament its structure. It follows the 
mission of parergonomics: the work done by the by-work, the stresses absorbed by 
relaxation.
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Something fundamentally different occurs here from simply making use of the 
reproductive qualities of industrial casting. During the course of the Arcades 
Project, Walter Benjamin turns against Art Nouveau, criticizing its tendency of 
figuration as “the stylizing style par excellence,” calling it “a reactionary attempt to 
sever technologically constituted forms from their functional contexts and turn 
them into natural constants, that is to stylize them.”59 That’s a wholly modernist 
critique, and reckless too: blinded by ideology, the radical program of Art Nouveau 
escapes him. Basically, he refuses to accept the by-work transforming the work via 
the route of figuration, a feat purely effectuated by stylization as we have learned 
from Leroi-Gourhan’s analysis of cave painting. For Benjamin, it comes down to 
“an affair of petit-bourgeois parvenus,”60 making Art Nouveau’s sleepwalking a 
matter of false consciousness, a collective state of denial, hopelessly trying to save 
the aura by a technological system in the process of abolishing it by replacing 
radiance with the transparency and clarity of structural functioning.61 In his 
Freudian Marxism, the repression of the working class by the bourgeois leisure 
class runs parallel to the suppression of the functional structural work by useless 
ornamental by-work. In short, according to Benjamin, ornament alienates 
structure: when structure looks in the mirror, so to speak, it sees ornament, not 
itself. This is the same psychology of dialectics we encountered in Bachelard, a 
dialectics defined by the incapacity for what we have earlier called self-othering. 
Art Nouveau is far more radical and intelligent than opting for dialectics: it does 
not cast the soft in the hard as an act of repression and submission, it inseminates 
the hard with the soft to find its way to appearance. As stated earlier, the hard 
conceives the soft. Yes, it fully accepts the powers of reproduction, but as much as 
powers of physis as of mimesis. It involves an absorptive mimesis; the soft-hard 
relationship between wax, iron, and mold is one of internalization, not one of 
external shapes and alienation.
The Surrealist painter Salvador Dalí proved far more insightful than Walter 
Benjamin on this matter. For the same issue of Minotaure in which Breton published 
his surrealist manifesto of automatism, Dalí wrote an article on the “terrifying and 
edible beauty” of Art Nouveau, speaking of its “extra-plastic character.”62 In a brilliant 
epiphany, Dalí, the champion of formlessness, compares Guimard’s two lampposts to 
Millet’s The Angelus painting. A “metallic atavism of Millet’s Angelus,” he calls it.63 The 
two peasants in Millet’s painting, standing opposite each other with their heads 
piously bowed in prayer and their hands folded in front of them, exactly mirror the 
two lampposts with their bent tips holding red glass bulbs and their limb-like stalks 
splitting off halfway to hold the signage. What stunning insight into the powers of 
mimesis! That is, of mimesis, of reproduction, and their historical impulses. Being 
more than an industrial copying mechanism, reproductive technology drills 
wormholes between disparate and diachronic images, not unlike Auerbach’s divine—
eternal and anachronic—spirit. “Atavism” is exactly the right word, and especially in 
its form of “metallic atavism” it denotes a reproductive technology that turns the 
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notion of mining into a psychology where ore and iron function as Dalian 
“psychoplastic” substances. Art Nouveau thus turns into an upgraded, improved 
form of revivalism, a Gothic Atavism; not simply the recurrence of the old, but 
phenotechnically reproduced.
Before we further study the entanglement of reproduction and mimesis, 
even that of psychological automatism and technological automatics, we should 
follow figuration all the way to its completion, the transfiguration stage. Since 
it occurs mainly on the level of smaller household objects, we should call this the 
ceramic-floral transformation. Art Nouveau’s evocation of the spirit is omnipresent: 
we are surrounded not only by plants, but by butterflies, dragonflies, peacocks 
and dragons, salamanders, snakes, octopuses, nymphs, sylphs, maidens of all 
kinds, elves, and of course flowers: waterlilies, periwinkles, buttercups, poppies, 
columbines, cyclamens, jonquils, snowdrops, thistles even, and more. Every object, 
be it a vase, a pen, an ink well, a pillow, a jewel box, a flask, a doorknob, a knife, fork, 
bottle, carafe, anything, they all exude spirits, and transform into spirits. Nothing 
comes to us unattended. The spirits are the pets or guardians of things, and in the 
transition of thing to appearance, where the vegetal stage emphasizes the first part 
of that transition, moving stance into figuration, we encounter the figure here in its 
sideways turn toward us, as an appearance. Appearance is the self-movement of 
things; that is why on this level the vegetable mixes with the animal. Are they 
animals caught in stone or flowers moving beyond themselves? Like an attending 
spirit or a daemon on the leash of a thing, it enables a thing’s mobility and allows 
it to wander about.
What Art Nouveau understands so well is that spirits dwell in both senses of the 
word, residing as well as lingering, and views belonging not as being nailed to 
topos, but as wandering around it. The English word “dwelling” relates etymologically 
to the Dutch dwalen, which likewise signifies lingering, wandering, or roaming, 
a meaning we already encountered in the first chapter when we considered the 
various connotations of the Italian word for “charm,” vaghezza, that signifies 
vagueness and wandering too. The aquarium of Art Nouveau’s house is that of 
lingering beings. Similar to the Medieval Gothic, this vagueness between motion 
and stillness carries a strong spectral component that points in the direction of 
ghostly spectrality as well as the color spectrum. In the world of the figurate and 
the florid it is the colors that wander, not the objects. Every possible technique is 
explored: the elaborate color schemes of wallpaper and tapestries, the obsession 
with makeup, the glazing techniques of ceramics, and most dazzling of all, the 
chemical techniques using metal salts to create opalescence on glassware and 
ceramics. When looking at a wall of blue tiles fired by William de Morgan,64 for 
example, we see pure movement, the pure vibration of blue, not unlike the 
shimmering electric blue of television screens. It is the art of making walls glow, 
and not by applying paint from a pot. The color has been created in direct 
association with the mineral tile at high temperature, and each tile produces its 
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own state of blueness, so when hundreds of these tiles are assembled alongside one 
another, the whole surface starts to shake and quiver. This notion of movement is 
taken even further by the techniques of iridescence where the color is embedded 
in a metallic layer, breaking the light differently with the slightest displacement of 
either the light source or the onlooker. This subtlety of movement again strongly 
affects the form of the objects. The iridescent vases of the Lötz factories, for 
instance, combine the vague shapes of blown glass with extraordinary coloration, 
often in striped or wavy patterns. Iridescence is the mobile conception of color; it 
is flicker and shimmer taken literally.
One has to share the house with thing-spirits. The radicalism of Art Nouveau is 
this: that to be at home we have to absorb the Other, and this can only happen via 
mimesis. It is not the house as extension of the Self like Heidegger’s realm of 
familiarity, nor that of pure alienated alterity, but a blurred, aqueous, and thick 
atmosphere of self-othering. And the ultimate figure of the Self-Other is Narcissus, 
the FlowerMan, to paraphrase one of Donna Haraway’s compound figurations. The 
figurative water of the house of Art Nouveau is the same water of the pool which 
trapped Narcissus. His love is not between his face and its reflection; it is between 
him and the figure down below in the water. The well is a deep mirror, the instrument 
of absorptive mimesis. Narcissus, we should keep in mind, does not fall in love with 
himself—the flawed Freudian analysis—he falls in love with someone else: his Other. 
We should underscore these last two words since they concern an Other as much as 
his Self, a construct we call a “double,” or Doppelgänger in German.65 Narcissus falls 
in love, but his love proves unresponsive, merely echoing everything he says. 
Inevitably, sadness takes an ever stronger hold of him. Every time he sheds his tears 
in the water the Other disappears, and in the end he dies of sorrow and changes into 
a flower. Amore sui inardescens Narcissus in florem transmutatur: his burning love 
made Narcissus change into a flower.66 Of course, Art Nouveau reverses Ovid’s story 
and starts with the flower; hence the relevance of Sternberger’s analogy to the 
mythology of Narcissus. The story is reversed from tragic to consolatory. The house 
starts with the flower, then adds water, turns it into a mirror, to unite us at the end 
with our own death. The house of Art Nouveau is not one of comfort; it is one of 
solace.
The house explicitly plays with the idea of death: “sofas deep as tombs,” as 
Benjamin quotes from Proust who is again quoting Baudelaire’s The Death of 
Lovers.67 In no other form of architecture is the resident surrounded with such an 
excess of textiles: cushions, curtains, upholstery, carpets, tapestries; there is more 
clothing and lining on the part of the architecture than on the bodies of its 
inhabitants. In this house every room turns into a bedroom. The textile analysis 
forms the best part of Benjamin’s study: the connection in Art Nouveau between 
ennui (boredom) and étui (case), the house as a velvet container:
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It conceived the residence as a receptacle for the person, and it encased him 
with all his appurtenances so deeply in the dwelling’s interior that one might be 
reminded of the inside of a compass case, where the instrument with all its 
accessories lies embedded in deep, usually violet folds of velvet.68
It does not require much effort on our part to see the analogy between the person 
lying in the case lined with velvet and Palissy’s frog lying in its coffin of plaster. The 
tomb-sofa analogy reminds me of two other sofas: Edgar Allan Poe’s sofa in The 
Philosophy of Furniture,69 where the inhabitant lies asleep on his couch surrounded 
by all the objects in his house; and the sofa of Leo Tolstoy, who on March 1, 1897 
enters the following words in his diary:
As I was walking around dusting things off in my room, I came to the sofa. For 
the life of me, I couldn’t recall whether I had already dusted it off or not. Since 
movements are habitual and unconscious, I felt that it was impossible to 
remember it . . . if the complex life of many people takes place entirely on the 
level of the unconscious, then it’s as if this life has never been.70
Maybe we should italicize that last part: as if this life has never been. We are getting 
closer to the heart of the matter. Benjamin’s critique is accurate as an observation, 
not as a critique. It indicates what Art Nouveau deliberately sets out to do and 
moreover, what it needs to do: to bring us in contact with the spectral. Art Nouveau 
consciously recreates Ruskin’s “veil of strange intermediate being” that flips back 
and forth between the moving and the still, in other words, between life and death.71 
And so it accepts the critical distance between us and things, only to fill it up with 
water and velvet. This makes Art Nouveau radically acritical, purposefully solving 
and dissolving differences but not without first acknowledging the discreteness of 
things. A dangerous game maybe, but a necessary one. Certainly, it proceeds in a 
different manner than the Medieval Gothic, which was a communal effort, and its 
spectral nature which presented the relic in a rounded halo was a form of communal 
solace, showing the spirits are on our side. Art Nouveau’s Metallic Gothic purely 
addresses the individual. On the other hand, individuality is undeniably part of 
death. Death in general, even the death of others, implies our own death. For an 
acritical, that is, phenotechnical analysis of Art Nouveau, we should foreground its 
spectralism and the technological nature of spectralism. The images allowing us to 
exchange our living selves with our dead selves are technical images; they must be 
fabricated. That is why Art Nouveau presents us with the image of paradise, as 
Sternberger stated, aptly adding that “it does not aim to achieve a classless society 
but a guiltless one,” basically saying that guilt is a form of self-repression.72
Paradise is not merely a state of bliss: all creatures are present including their 
differences, just like on earth, except that they have stopped eating each other, 
fighting each other, and having sex with each other. It is a world of difference 
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without differences, a world of self-otherings. While paradise does not distinguish 
between life and death it retains individuality. The distances between things remain 
without being critical. Art Nouveau is not only radically acritical then, it is also 
radically infertile. Walter Benjamin could not stomach that. The Arcades Project 
contains many references to infertility, of which the best known is:
The extreme point in the technological organization of the world is the 
liquidation of fertility. The frigid woman embodies the ideal of beauty in 
Jugendstil. (Jugendstil sees in every woman not Helena but Olympia.)73
The figure of Olympia is that of E. T. A. Hoffmann’s story The Sandman, a story that 
bears a certain resemblance to the myth of Narcissus since the protagonist, Nathaniel, 
falls in love with a woman named Olympia who is later revealed to be an automaton. 
On many occasions, this story has been referenced in the context of what Freud 
called “the uncanny,” das Unheimliche, literally “the unhomely.”74 Generally speaking, 
homely and unhomely signify comfort and discomfort, comfort as the minimizing 
of the gap between us and things, discomfort as its maximization. Art Nouveau does 
not opt for either one; it aims for a spectrality minus the uncanny, and for technology 
minus the familiarity. Meaning, a technology not of comfort, where things disappear 
behind the curtain of service, but of appearances. Nothing is invisible or repressed. 
Frigidity does not take the form of neurosis here, but of design: presenting us with 
beauty, yet without the sex, and presenting us with technology without the 
functionality. It offers us dysfunctional technology without being uncomfortable 
because it simultaneously offers us appearances that work perfectly fine.
When Olympia the automaton plays the harpsichord so well—as she does in 
Hoffmann’s story—and a harpsichord is a piece of furniture, does that make 
Olympia a piece of furniture too, that is, a mobile part of the house? I think it does, 
and that must be why Benjamin chose it as an analogy for Art Nouveau: the ideal 
inhabitant falls in love with his house. Narcissus’s story goes a step further than 
Hoffmann’s, because it ends with his death and transformation into a flower. 
Yet the message is clear: Olympia is Narcissus’s other half, the automaton is his 
appearance. The automaton is as much a mimetic doubling of the Other as a 
prosthetic extension of the Self. In other words, the self-movement of Olympia 
coincides with the self-othering of Narcissus. Here again, we shouldn’t read 
Benjamin’s remark as critique, but as an accurate observation, as is indirectly 
suggested by Sternberger: Art Nouveau follows the program of Narcissus without 
being narcissist. What we encounter here is the conflation of psychological 
automatism, the drawing and writing without a proper Self; Tolstoy’s automatic 
dusting, the inhabiting without a proper Self; and technological automation 
including the automata of Hephaestus, which is the realm of technological doubles 
or robots. Yet, these automatisms link up indirectly, via haloes and appearances, 
not blindly like cogwheels.
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The radically paradoxical machinery of the phenotechnical: things work 
without touching and they appear without being seen. Their appearance works. 
Where Benjamin worries about the dangers of mechanical reproduction replacing 
natural reproduction, we should acknowledge—with the help of Breton, Guimard, 
and Dalí—the machines’ auratic spirit.75 Surely it is infertile only from the viewpoint 
of natural procreation, not in the context of a nonhuman or human-machine 
intimacy, which requires artificial forms of insemination, as we saw in the Millet-
Guimard transfer, or forms of ferric-vegetable transgenderism. Let us keep in 
mind that Guimard’s vegetal interventions concern subway entrances. Art Nouveau 
does not “force the auratic” on technology, as Benjamin thought,76 it discovers and 
uncovers the auratic there, in a new form. The subway is a cave-like structure, 
forming what Eliade would call “a new matrix,” a mine-like network of underground 
veins of iron.77 The Metallic Gothic is rooted in the mobility of iron, where it 
invents its own forms of guiltless sex and crossdressing mimesis, following all the 
ceremonial rules of Semper’s rite of transfiguration. The house of Art Nouveau 
surrounds us with spirit-automatons, self-movers that prompt us to move in a 
constant exchange of movement and stoppage.
How else could we live in a house? Just imagine yourself alone at home sitting 
in a room, and thinking of all the other rooms in the house. Are these rooms to be 
thought of as empty? No. Spectrally, phenotechnically, we are still there, as are our 
co-residents and even the previous inhabitants. The house imprints us, especially 
by mobilizing its surfaces and by freely shedding its objects, all the way to the 
smallest one. It covers the whole range from rigid walls mobilized by wallpaper, 
photos, and paintings; to mobile but sluggish furniture such as chairs and desks; to 
handily movable parts such as doors and windows; to textiles such as bedsheets, 
curtains, and pillows; to the lightest transient objects such as bills waiting on the 
table or a towel left on the countertop. There is a specific magic to a door left ajar 
or the rings left by a coffee cup. By distributing itself over the whole range between 
the hardest and the softest, the house has the power of conjuring us up. It does not 
house us, the house conjures us. It is like that photo of an empty chair by the late 
French philosopher Jean Baudrillard, whose thought strongly revolved around 
taking pictures. The photo, titled Sainte Beuve, shows a traditional, red velvet 
armchair with a high backrest and a thick blanket of a similar red loosely draped 
over it. From the many flattened folds in the cloth, we can see somebody has been 
sitting in the chair for a long while, leaving behind the imprint of his or her 
presence.
It is a very powerful image. What exactly do we see? Is it death? For sure. Or is 
it use? That too. One could even say it is ornament, since it concerns a form of 
drapery. All three are simultaneously true: death, drapery, and use. Each of the 
three cannot be without the other; existence requires the continuous exchange of 
stillness, readiness, and movement. And while we are back at the topic of readiness, 
let us recall how Heidegger speaks of the doorknob of the lecture room he 
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never consciously notices, understanding it as an act of Dienlichkeit,78 of 
serviceability on the part of the thing, like a lackey obligingly making himself 
invisible by stepping back behind the curtains. Heidegger mistakes our diminished 
consciousness and automatism for an alleged invisibility of the doorknob. He does 
not see that the exchange works because of the thing’s automatism: the doorknob 
turns itself before he turns it, just like the jug, and just like the blanket in the chair 
creased by a spectral inhabitant. The thousands of hands that turned the knob in 
the past made it round, and now, at the moment he grabs it, that spectral roundness 
turns his hand. Not the thing is invisible, we are.
Phenomenology reasons by connecting visibility to seeing, and Heideggerian 
ontology reasons complementarily by connecting invisibility to workings, while in 
contrast to both, phenotechnology connects visibility to workings: we do not “see” 
things, we act and move in the glowing halo of their appearance. That makes the 
house of Art Nouveau anything but a private museum, which would constantly 
demand of us that we halt and look, which is what visitors or critics would do, not 
inhabitants, who pass everything by. The whole magical secret lies in the not-
stopping and not-looking, in absorbing figuration via our daily routines. Art 
Nouveau accepts the phenotechnical analysis in the most radical manner by filling 
the house with watchful guardian spirits that help us turn the doorknob, sit in a 
chair, eat our meals, have a conversation, or go to bed. Not being servants, not 
acting for us or instead of us, they help us act, give us relief, lift the pen we pick up 
without any extra thought while we sit with our backs to the wall covered with 
wallpaper and unseen paintings.
the Soft Machine and plastic
When we start to contemplate the twentieth century as part of the history of soft-
hard technologies, the first thing that comes to mind is how it broadened the range 
of applications of softness, even how it pushed that history into a state of pure 
softness, a state that goes beyond the usual preparatory stage to rigidity. The era 
developed a veritable passion for softness: rubber in all shapes and sizes; grease 
and jelly; thousands of types of foam and almost as many types of gels; plastics of 
all sorts; silicones and plastic surgery; cuddly toys and teddy bears; all the way to 
lava lamps, Slime, Silly Putty, liquid light, liquid crystals, and of course, chewing 
gum. Nothing explains the twentieth century better than looking at somebody 
endlessly ruminating chewing gum, be it in the form of short abrupt bites or a slow 
rotational motion, interrupted by the inflation of a bubble that ends in its popping, 
with its remains reeled in by the tongue to start the process all over. The 
accompanying “silky gaze” is no accident, the continuous chewing loops one back 
into oneself. The image of chewing without eating reveals a radicalization of 
softness, as if it is part of a process that will never reach the stage of product, a 
softness that may never even reach the mold.
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These images give us a hint of the character of plastic psychology and how it 
might differ from the lithic and the ferric. Asking the question of pure plasticity, or 
as Dalí called it, the extra-plastique, in the case of the lithic or the ferric would be 
to ask what would happen to the water when caught in the limestone or to the wax 
unable to leave the iron. It would result in a plasticity constantly on the lookout for 
form, and would, in the context of Auerbach’s definition of the figure as “plastic 
form,”79 mean either continuous transformation, or the very form itself taking 
on formlessness by becoming rounded, premature, and amorphous. Physis in a 
continuous search for mimesis. The latter, in our form of absorptive mimesis where 
one material mimics another by interiorization, implies that the plastic is caught in 
an endless process of metamorphosis. Dalí’s use of the term “edible architecture” 
for Art Nouveau was not some happy phrase, it precisely identified the stage of 
interiority, the continuous chewing without finding its form, though I hasten to add 
that his words were a typical twentieth-century statement, not one from the fin-de-
siècle itself. Dalí, being on his way to the Plastic Age, overemphasized Art Nouveau’s 
wax-like malleability, and therefore the phase of interiorization, in the same way 
Breton was expanding on the self-referential scrolls of automatic drawing. In that 
sense, we can say the plastic eschews the phases of both prefiguration and figuration, 
and strives for nothing less than immediate transfiguration.
This will be our hypothesis: in contrast to the lithic and the ferric, the realm of 
the plastic consists of a single-phased figuration process, that of the plastic-floral 
transformation, striving for immediate psychological flourishing and interior 
presence.
With the plastic we seem to have entered an age of amorphism and pure color, 
maybe even spectralism. We only have to take one look at the plastic chairs and the 
chairs made of foam or vinyl, some even inflatable or adaptable in any possible 
form—all this in the strongest colors and the roundest of shapes—to understand 
how plastic psychology seeks what we have earlier called internal form,80 a form 
that is virtually amimetic, rhythmic, and in constant need of mental processing. We 
can see it even better when looking at the idiosyncratic psychedelic font styles, 
which are ultra-formless compared to those of Art Nouveau, swirling over posters 
and psychedelic album covers. The fonts are so shapeless that they are often 
squeezed between the edges of the paper and the contours of the images, while the 
images in their turn yield to the fonts, often responding by the staggered copying 
and offsetting of their contours, filling them with alternating and complementary 
colors. The psychedelic images contain on the one hand a component of doodling, 
that strange art of absent-mindedly filling sheets with flowers, zigzags, dots, stripes, 
and spirals in exploding, multiplying contours that are heavily decorated and 
tightly packed like fruit, while on the other hand maintaining a strong connection 
to stylistic elements of Art Nouveau.81 With the female nudes appearing at every 
possible opportunity and the loose hair looking more like water and oil, the images 
seem to affect the spirit itself, and instead of depicting spirits like Art Nouveau did, 
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they try to directly access the process of transfiguration. Psychedelic graphic design 
constantly tries to slip in auras and haloes, yet unlike their traditional portrayal as 
radial spikes emanating from things as in the case of Fra Angelico or Gustave 
Moreau, it shows them as amplified, ever widening contours in vibratory and 
flickering coloration, ecstatically dissolving their own object. With psychedelic 
design all objects seem to exist in a liquid medium, their contours rippling away, 
just before the moment of disappearance. And this loss of form is inversely 
proportional to the increase of color and color pattern. The best illustration of such 
a transfiguration is surely the use of liquid light, the ambient multicolor projections 
used chiefly at pop concerts during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Seeing the colors 
overlap and seek form while continuously rotating in slow motion is as if we are 
looking at the apocalyptic end of the rose window, liberating its color from the 
stone constrictions of tracery. By becoming liquid, color reached a state of pure 
plasticity. While the Gothic is a form of strong spectralism, liquid light is an instance 
of weak spectralism. And though we can speak of a general loss of form, there is still 
figuration, which is independent of the notion of form, yet involves figuration in 
transit to interiorization, turning into pure color along the way.
It is one thing to seek the absence of form and replace it with color, attempts that 
still concern the form of formlessness, i.e., the external form of interiority; it is 
quite another to achieve interiority directly. It should come as no surprise that weak 
spectralism is necessarily connected to the extensive drug experiments during the 
Plastic Age, though we should realize that that argument exceeds the scope of 
cultural history. Our interests are purely phenotechnical, and in the history of the 
halo, psychedelia form a crucial ingredient. It is a history of soft-hard technologies 
which by definition involves the relationship between weak and strong or structure 
and ornament, not as applied to architecture, but ontologically. Saying that, I would 
not hesitate to call psychotropic drug use the search for ornament in a time when 
there was none to be found in architecture. And I am certainly not the first to make 
this connection. We should recall that Walter Benjamin invents his illustrious 
notion of the “aura”—a term he later mainly applied to art historical analyses—
during his experiments with hashish. In his book on the subject, he regularly 
denotes aura in German as ornamentale Umzirkung (the latter word carrying the 
meaning of a radiant halo as well as that of a radial contour) emphasizing the direct 
connection between mind-altering drugs and ornament.82 We find another example 
of this link in the works of Henri Michaux, who describes the effects of mescaline 
as a form of “ornamentogenesis,” a term marking the typically staggered repetition 
of the ever widening contours of things, while constantly changing their colors and 
vibrancy.83 Michaux extensively studied these effects in his drawings. The British 
author Aldous Huxley similarly makes the comparison between mescaline-induced 
visions and jewelry in his 1956 essay Heaven and Hell, quoting from the neurologist 
Weir Mitchell who makes references to the Gothic:
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At his entry into that world he saw a host of “star points” and what looked like 
“fragments of stained glass.” Then came “delicate floating films of color.” These 
were displaced by an “abrupt rush of countless points of white light,” sweeping 
across the field of vision. Next there were zigzag lines of very bright colors, 
which somehow turned into swelling clouds of still more brilliant hues.84
Maybe the most interesting author in this respect is the German essayist Ernst 
Jünger, who immersed himself in experiments similar to those of Benjamin, 
Huxley, and Michaux, and followed the same theoretical impulses. Often 
accompanied by Albert Hofmann, the chemist who synthesized LSD, Jünger 
would indulge in day-long psychedelic trips, dressing himself for the occasion in 
“a long, broad, dark blue-striped kaftan-like garment he had bought in Egypt.”85 
Jünger speaks of his visionary experiences in the same terms of spectral coloration, 
but places the psychotropic effects back into the realm of the vegetable. After all, 
psychotropic drugs are derived from plants and fungi: “When we recognize the 
plant as an autonomous power that enters [eintritt] to take root and blossom in us, 
we move a few steps away from the erroneous view that insists the spirit is the 
monopoly of humans and does not exist apart from them.”86 Jünger uses the word 
Eintritt regularly to indicate the process of interiorization, extending it beyond the 
realm of chemicals and discussing the topic where it belongs, in the realms of 
consciousness. Rejecting the view that plants “expand” human consciousness, as is 
usually proclaimed, he views it as an exchange, even as the absorption of plant-
consciousness. Three pages later he adds: “A plant, although itself scarcely capable 
of movement, captivates things that move,”87 subtly pointing at the ambiguity of 
plant life’s involvement with humans. Though plants might offer themselves as 
food and even as a cure to human ailment, they might also kill. The notion of 
exchange remains ambiguous, a doubling we recognize from the ambivalence of 
the German word Gift, meaning both poison and gift. Analogous to the German 
term is the ancient Greek word pharmakon, so extensively discussed by Derrida, 
carrying the same double meaning of both psychotropic and medical drug.88 On a 
side note, maybe at this point it would be a good idea to give away the secret of the 
self-movement of Hephaestus’ automata: according to multiple sources it was 
produced by a small amount of herbal drugs (pharmaka) hidden in the hollow 
statue, to then be lit up and left smoldering during the length of the ceremony.89
Going from chewing gum, to doodling, to liquid light, to psychotropic drugs in 
the space of a few paragraphs might seem a bit of a stretch, and while from the 
viewpoint of historiography it may well be, phenotechnically these phenomena are 
intricately connected, showing that the tendency of plasticity, which is a tendency 
toward formlessness, is necessarily one toward interiorization and spectralism. In 
short, it involves a conceptual connection, not a causal one: it concerns the same 
spirit, and as we saw in the cases of the lithic and the ferric, such a spirit is of a 
technological nature. The phenotechnology of plastics is that of transfiguration.
36697.indb   151 15/05/2020   15:50
152      Grace and Gravity
Instead of following the impact of the broader cultural exchanges between 
plasticity and spectrality, we should redirect our attention toward architecture and 
focus more on possible connections to where we left our discussion of the house. 
This would mean not a looking for mere formal plasticity in architecture, but 
specifically for the architectural experiments with figuration and automation in 
an attempt to produce mind-altering effects. It sounds wild, but oddly enough a 
considerable number of architects at the time were involved in such experiments 
that unfortunately seldom lead to actual buildings. As we have learned from Art 
Nouveau, the combination of form and automation means above all a search for 
architectural self-movement, similar to what we encountered in the relationship 
between Olympia and Narcissus, namely, a resonance between the self-movement 
of the house and the self-othering of its inhabitant. One of the best examples of an 
architecture at the intersection of automatism and spectralism remains the short 
story titled “The Thousand Dreams of Stellavista,” written in 1962 by J. G. Ballard, 
the British science-fiction author and self-proclaimed surrealist.90 It involves a 
robotic, transformable house and though during the period many “soft houses” were 
conceived by architects, mostly in the form of inflatable structures or architectures 
of a continuous, “endless” geometry,91 Ballard’s model still stands out as wholly 
original. The story follows the involvement, if not affair, of the protagonist, a young 
lawyer named Howard Talbot, with his “PT house,” an acronym for a “psychotropic 
house.”92 At the beginning of the story, the actual mind-altering effects are not fully 
clear; initially, the house is described more in terms of biomechanics and responses.
The house, constructed mainly of a fictitious material called “Plastex,” allows for 
certain parts of the architecture to be movable in the sense of local displacements 
and transformations such as the “sudden deflatus of a corridor,” the “dilating and 
contracting” of the ceiling, and various deformations of the walls.93 The house, 
however, does not transform according to direct manipulation by the inhabitant. A 
built-in memory system records movements and habits via “sensocells,” enabling 
the house to imprint the mood and character of its inhabitant. Since 99 Stellavista 
is one of the older PT houses, it still contains the character of its previous 
inhabitant, Gloria Tremayne, a famous actress, now deceased. (So, from the dead 
saint of the Gothic we have arrived at the dead celebrity: the house as an automated 
relic.) The relationship between house-Gloria and inhabitant-Talbot at first seems 
to evolve quite smoothly:
It’s always interesting to watch a psychotropic house try to adjust itself to 
strangers, particularly those at all guarded or suspicious . . . Hidden rifts began 
to distort the sphere, ballooning out one of the alcoves like a bubble of over-
extended gum . . . The plastex swam and whirled like boiling toothpaste, then 
extruded itself into a small ledge.94
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Our resident, who once was a junior lawyer defending the famous actress on trial 
for the murder of her husband (an architect, as so often in Ballard’s stories), slowly 
becomes entangled in a more complex relationship with the house, and even 
divorces his wife because he finds himself gradually falling in love with the house-
movie star:
Blissfully, her presence would be everywhere in the house, a thousand echoes of 
her distilled into every matrix and sensocell, each moment of emotion blended 
into a replica more intimate than anyone, apart from her dead husband, could 
ever know.95
Throughout the story, however, it remains unclear if Talbot falls in love because 
the actress has now metamorphosed into a house, and is therefore to be viewed in 
the fin-de-siècle tradition of falling in love with one’s house, or whether the former 
affections that Talbot felt for the actress when he was a young lawyer have simply 
been revived. Although he now lives alone with the house, the liaison does not 
progress very blissfully and slowly turns sour. The walls “stiffen and darken in a 
vortex of anger”96 and close to the end, during what Ballard describes as a 
“convulsion” and a grand mal, the house starts to vibrate rapidly:
Sure enough, the corridor wall began to retract. The archway, usually a six-inch 
wide slit, rose to admit someone. Nothing came through, but the room expanded 
to accommodate an additional presence, the ceiling ballooning upwards . . . The 
pressure zone paused at the foot of the bed and hesitated for a few seconds. But 
instead of stabilizing, the walls began to vibrate rapidly, quivering with strange 
uncertain tremors, radiating a sensation of acute urgency and indecision . . . A 
second later, as I lifted myself up on one elbow, a violent spasm convulsed the 
room, buckling the walls and lifting the bed off the floor. The entire house 
started to shake and writhe.97
After the crisis Talbot decides to disconnect the system, saying that “one day soon, 
whatever the outcome, I know that I shall have to switch the house on again.”98
Appreciating the story within the context of soft-to-hard technologies can be 
illuminating, because it shows how the self-movement and automatism of the 
house goes beyond a technology of biomechanics to immediately turn into 
psychotropics. This is the main insight of the narrative: the technology of 
automation cannot be explained technically, only phenotechnically, that is, in its 
dependence on mimesis and softness. One would wish that all engineers and 
companies involved in robotics would have a basic grasp of the fundamental 
mimetic nature of automation, instead of viewing automation as a matter of mere 
service and comfort. We are invariably presented with service and comfort from 
the viewpoint of handiness and prosthetics, of the mere extension of the Self, but we 
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have seen over and over again that prosthetics cannot work without mimesis, that 
is, without self-othering. The extension is not added on but incorporated. Ballard’s 
story, then, is elevated from the position of a curious fantasy existing at the margins 
of architectural history to the very center of the issue of home automation, if not of 
all forms of automation. The PT house is not psychotropic because it acts on the 
mind via the pharmaka of drugs but via the Hephaestian pharmaka of the self-
movement of things that surround us, provoking an immediate effect on our 
psyche. This is what plastic psychology means: the dynamics between soft and soft 
that takes the process of mimesis to a whole other level. In Eliade’s words, matrix 
and matter seem to be made of the same material: wax inhabiting wax. Wax 
conceiving wax. The story presents us with two “soft machines,” to borrow William 
Burroughs’s term: the human with its automatic habits à la Tolstoy and the 
automatic robot-house playing the diva, being in fact a soft robot, a variable one, not 
merely mechanical. In all our softness, we humans seek repetition and regularity, 
while the robot in all its hardness seeks unique and individual behavior.
In the case of Olympia, the hard robot, we asked ourselves if she shouldn’t be 
considered more a part of the house, whereas with Gloria, we should ask ourselves 
if the house is not more like an extra inhabitant. When we are soft and the house is 
soft, the result is immediate transfiguration. It is as if house and inhabitant are 
chewing on each other, continuously looping the Other back into their Selves. 
Where does this process end exactly? This is precisely the central question in the 
myth of Narcissus: How deep is the mirror? Or: What is the depth of the water? 
Does the Other merely appear on the surface or does he or she live in the depths? 
When the water returns more than mere reflections, that is, gives more than 
immediate responses to external incentives of a Self, how much delay or change is 
needed for it to become Other? How much memory is needed? Automated 
architecture is generally understood as purely reflective, as the instant gratification 
of needs, as the uninterrupted extension of the Self, even in the concept of 
“responsive environments” proposed by Reyner Banham in 1965.99 Ballard’s house 
takes us in a diametrically opposed direction: it is purely the memory of a previous 
inhabitant, not of the current one, and therefore wholly Other. Existing between 
these two extremes, the example of the Paleolithic cave showed us that self-othering 
remains a question of water and stone, reflection and memory. Then, when the 
house in fact becomes an Other, i.e., capable of self-movement according to Hegel’s 
definition, at what point does it start to alienate? For a technical form of self-
othering this is an essential question: it needs to find a position between the 
reflective Self and the alienating Other. Find that point and you will find love. For 
any type of robotic architecture it is—will be—essential to understand that it 
cannot simply be reasoned from the viewpoint of comfort and prosthetics; robots 
or automatons are mimetic, but that mimesis can only be successful via the route of 
physis, that is, the route of internalization and depth.
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At this point Hegel’s history of self-consciousness dissolves. The conceptual core 
of dialectics, the opposition between Herr und Knecht, master and servant, can 
never be resolved dialectically, only contrapuntally, because they are bound to 
absorb each other mimetically. The historical project of self-movement, then, being 
dependent on self-othering, should be read as a history of mutual empowering 
instead of Hegel’s history of alternating overpowerings. Traditionally, the dialectic 
of master and servant translates in architecture directly into that of the inhabitant 
as the master of the house and that inhabitant being served, what the architect 
Louis Kahn called “served” and “servant” spaces, where the latter could mean 
literally the space for servants and storage, but also that of lift shafts, ventilation, 
and sewerage, as well as the hollow walls and ceilings where architects hide support 
structure and plumbing.100 Surely, it is no accident that the word “domination,” like 
“domestication,” is derived from the Latin domus, “house.” This archetypal form of 
bondage follows a history that runs from house slaves to domestic servants such 
as butlers and housekeepers, to then be taken over by a plethora of household 
technology such as refrigerators, ovens, washing machines, microwaves, alarm and 
air conditioning systems, leading seamlessly to our contemporary internet of things 
and smart homes. Hardly a history of emancipation, but certainly one of self-
movement.
Yet, when we ask ourselves at every stage of this development who in fact 
dominates who, we invariably get ambiguous answers. Who exactly is the master of 
the house when the butler brings the scotch a second before it is ordered? What 
exactly goes on when a servant has adapted so perfectly to the master? Is that still 
serving or is it pampering? Who lives whose life? (A question so poignantly raised 
in The Servant, the British 1948 book and 1963 movie that end with completely 
reversed roles of master and servant.) And what about that perfection being 
developed in its modern technological form, e.g., when the air is automatically 
conditioned? What or who is then being conditioned? Let us not forget that from 
a psychological viewpoint the hollow spaces of technology, which architects 
traditionally draw as monolithically solid and indicate with the Beaux-Arts term 
poché, are regarded as highly ambiguous, as often functioning as the space of 
daydreams—the attic being a room of play, for instance—as that of nightmares: 
virtually no horror or science-fiction movie goes without the monsters entering the 
living quarters via sewers or air ducts. The ambiguity of serviceability reaches its 
apex in the electronic form of the smart home saturated with ubiquitous computing, 
which appears more and more like a life-support system or a form of intensive care: 
the inhabitant as patient, with the house claiming more and more of its mobility.101
When phenotechnology tells us that no technological system attempting to 
extend the Self should ever be considered from a solely prosthetic viewpoint, 
but as part of Auerbach’s history of mimesis, then technology, and especially the 
technology of automation, is responsible for an increasingly vital part of that 
project, and cannot be understood through the meager rhetoric of servitude 
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and support. Ballard’s story, like most of his work, shows that by definition any 
technological justification of technology is inherently flawed. Just imagine a smart 
home in a more extreme form. The fully automated house of comfort would close 
its own curtains, wake you up on time, would order your books and replenish the 
groceries, clean the windows, and maybe one day dust your sofa; in short, it would 
gradually have taken over to live your life. While trying to close the gap between us 
and things, the house automatically starts to replace its inhabitant. Unwittingly, it 
would realize the myth of the Doppelgänger, yet without the myriad of mimetic 
imagery that has always accompanied the double. And we should keep in mind 
that the myth of the Doppelgänger always tells the story of meeting our deaths. The 
dream of the purely prosthetic ends like Edgar Allan Poe’s story “The Man That Was 
Used Up”: after removing the last of many prostheses, nothing much is left.
We should, for a moment, consider the reverse option, a house of the pure gap, 
the house of discomfort and the deconstructionist hiatus, what the architectural 
historian and essayist Anthony Vidler called an “architecture of the uncanny.”102 No 
doubt that would amount to a critical project, one trying to restore interruption in 
the sense of a Benjaminian Kritik by deconstructing comfort and service. Where 
would that leave us?—in a whirl of Freudian fantasies. Critique does not enable the 
looping of the prosthetic and the mimetic, as we saw from Benjamin’s views on Art 
Nouveau, it merely wants to distance itself and cut off our all-too intimate relations 
with things. And at the moment we are cut off, our fantasies start escalating. In fact, 
Freud’s uncanny is inextricably linked to castration, a notion that turns a theory of 
the double and mimesis into one of loss. Freudian prosthetics is not linked to 
mimesis but to a lack and a gap; he even viewed the Doppelgänger as a fetishized 
stand-in for missing members.103 What in the relic was a source of radiance, the 
inclusion of absence in the flickering of presence, turns with the uncanny into its 
opposite: the objectification of absence. The first is a project of beauty and love, the 
second of the sublime and fear. In the latter view, Olympia becomes the self-moving, 
severed body part constantly referring to a static absence that cannot be healed. 
All mimesis and exchange is excluded. The uncanny is merely the psychological 
result of our confrontation with an immobile and unnegotiable gap—the gap as 
obstacle104—and is therefore even more dialectical than the opposition of master 
and servant since it opposes the Self with its negation: aiming to restore the gap, it 
reinforces dialectics. Ergo, the critique of servitude turns out worse than servitude 
itself. Restoring the gap is an absolute necessity, but only as the starting point for 
the discharge of appearances, the sequence of figuration, not as the installment of 
the mere gap, rupture or Riss; an attempt to reinstate the sublime with its immobile 
aesthetic of abyss and negation.
This leaves us with only one viable option: accepting and developing automation 
not as a project of comfort but as one of mimesis, that is, deep, absorptive mimesis. 
In terms of the figures we introduced during the course of this chapter, this would 
mean that Olympia’s self-movement needs to meet Narcissus’ self-othering 
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halfway, in the gap. The gap always consists of two halves, what we have earlier 
called the double gap, namely the gap between our automatisms and our actions 
on the one hand, and between our actions and our environment on the other. 
Grace requires just enough otherness to enable the Self. Precisely at this point 
Ballard’s house faltered as well, not so much because it absorbed the psychology of 
an actress who slowly descended into madness, but mainly as a result of failing to 
sufficiently absorb its current inhabitant. The PT house all too easily tilts over to a 
house of discomfort and alienation. There is self-movement, yet no self-othering. 
The crossing of the gap is as subtle as the sizing of the gap. A halfway-meeting 
means the gap needs to be of a particular size: automation neither as the extension 
of our own automatisms and habits nor as the pure installation of otherness and 
alienation. Somewhere between these two, between reflection and memory, there 
should be enough delay and change that records our activities and returns—
“plays”—them slightly altered, unsettling us enough without throwing us in the 
abyss of uprootedness. Above all, it would mean not replacing the house of perfect 
workings with one that does not work, but with one that allows technology and 
automation to appear, instead of just doing its job. The fact that Gloria is, ultimately, 
a techno-mythological figure, is the main achievement of Ballard’s project, where 
the technical responses amount to and accumulate into a self-telling story, maybe 
even a self-generative game, instead of just a bunch of dispersed effects—a line of 
thought we will be resolutely pursuing in the final chapter. The narrative lets her 
presence wander through the house, change her moods where needed while 
challenging and intervening in everyday routines, as well as suddenly disappear 
and remain silent. (It’s always a sign of storytelling when the absence of a character 
adds to the continuity of the narrative.)
What Ballard’s story proves is that every house is a double house: the space we 
inhabit and the space the house itself inhabits, and that is why we are never sure if 
our mood is not that of the house. Yet, the PT house would need an upgraded 
version where the things surrounding us come to life all right, even confronting us 
spectrally with our own deaths, yet not going so far as to bury us on the spot or 
chase us out of the house. I am just wondering what it would mean, figuratively 
speaking, to see our earlier examples, such as Baudrillard’s folds in the blanket or 
the rings left by the coffee cup, take shape in an electronic, automated form. Like 
Ballard’s PT house, it would involve a definite shift of architecture’s intelligence 
from the hard to the soft by moving all the technology generally dedicated to 
structure and stability to the domain of textile with its curtains, carpets, cushions, 
and consequently to that of ornament. True, the blanket folds and coffee rings are 
futile, quotidian instances, yet they indicate the possibly variable depths and 
layerings of memory that would be able to bridge the chasm between the pure 
immediacy of our daily actions and the memorizations architecture traditionally 
makes use of in the form of preprogrammed spaces such as bedroom, living room, 
kitchen, and the like. It would involve an electronic house of imprinting, as if 
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Narcissus now stares into thicker, slow water, water that would also have the power 
to change images, substantiate them, and create new figures that would stay with us 
to suddenly disappear and to reappear again. Maybe even create an individuated 
mythology.
What kind of imprints could those be, and how long should they last? Maybe 
some ought to last very long, staying over many generations, like ancestors. Such a 
viscous, electroplastic, or in Dalí’s terms, extraplastic—if not psychoplastic—
architecture would continue to be an art of slowness, a medium that etymologically 
abhors immediacy, though without too much difficulty we could imagine a whole 
variety of speeds. Fast gifts and slow responses, or as we put it in the first chapter: 
fast stillness and still movement. Speeds of recording and speeds of playing: an 
architecture thus affected by the quality of play and games would open up a whole 
new field of possible figuration techniques. From that moment on appearances 
would immediately start to function as spirits, as we saw too in the Paleolithic 
caves: the animals on the walls started to move because of the moving torches. And 
vice versa. Are we moving them or are they moving us?—that is the central 
question of grace, if not of the entire book. Grace works exactly there where that 
question cannot be answered anymore, because between Self, Other, and spirit a 
gift cycle starts to get going that makes the figure simultaneously an interior and 
an exterior appearance.
Such a spectral “House of the Spirits” where nothing is really buried, would be 
what Aristotle once called a thaumaton automaton, a wondrous self-mover, a house 
that would accommodate automata not as servants, i.e., as self-movers moving-for 
and moving-instead-of us, nor would it consider its inhabitant the master of the 
house. Non-domesticated automata cohabiting with non-dominating inhabitants. 
As stated above, every house is a double house, that is how it was 27,000 years ago 
in the caves and that is what it would be in its automated form. Viewed from that 
perspective, I cannot see anything but a Hegelian history—minus the dialectics—
driven by a teleology of self-movement converging more and more with Auerbach’s 
history of mimesis, driven by a teleology of self-othering. What we have called 
parergonomics would take the form of an ornamental robotics or phenorobotics, a 
technology based on the ornament-apparatus ambiguity that we discussed in the 
previous chapter, seeking the technological self-movement of appearances, in 
essence no different from the fairies, elves, sprites, spirits, and specters of Art 
Nouveau, nor from the tripods, silver dogs, and golden maidens of Hephaestian 
mythology.
Spectral architecture accepts the gap, just as the figurate architectures of the 
Cave Gothic, the Medieval Gothic, and the Metallic Gothic did. Yet in all these 
atavisms of the Gothic, the gap turned into a medium, a room fulfilled by and filled 
with appearances; it did not present itself as unbridgeable. Medium—in all its 
possible meanings—implies spirit and self-movement at the same time: it contains 
the glistening of consciousness as well as the conductivity of movement. In these 
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instances of the medium water, liquidity and plasticity played key roles, though 
in different forms. The water makes the gap mobile. The softness allowing hard 
structure to turn into appearance is also what moves matter toward us; after all, 
appearances are the vehicles of things. The installment of the gap is necessary to 
posit the Other as the start of the process of absorptive mimesis, not as the 
installment of alienation or alterity. The spectral, as the terminal form of the 
figurate, embraces the notion of automation, automatism, and automata, yet as a 
strategy of visibility, as the technical self-movement of ornament, flipping back 
and forth between vegetal and animal forms of transformation. Where the house 
of comfort merely seeks to extend the Self, and the house of discomfort seeks to 
install the Other, a spectral architecture would seek to move the Other toward us, 
just enough for the Self to engage in mimesis: at this point self-movement and self-
othering start to touch, at the very moment the spectral starts to shimmer and 
shine.
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